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Abstract
The thesis presents three essays on privatisation and market reform in infrastructure
industries. An analysis of the British railway sector over a period of 40 years in-
vestigates whether the privatisation and divestiture of the former state monopolist
led to performance improvements. Statistical and econometric analysis highlights the
importance of scale economies. Further, there are strong suggestions that while libe-
ralisation initially led to an increase in cost efficiency, performance deteriorated over
time. The second essay looks at a very broad sample of over 2000 publicly and priva-
tely owned utilities in OECD countries. A range of performance measures are used
to establish that market reform and private ownership have a statistically and eco-
nomically significant impact on firm profitability and efficiency. Sub-sample analysis
suggests that the effects are not uniform across industries. Building on some stylised
facts, the third essay proposes a theoretical model of contract length in a monopoly
franchise bidding system. In particular, the model introduces a mechanism, which
can induce bidders to reveal the total surplus-maximising contract length to the unin-
formed regulator. In addition, it is established that in some cases truth revelation
comes at a cost, and that bidders can extract a strictly positive information rent.
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Introduction
The general theoretical and empirical body of the literature on privatisation appears
to have come to the conclusion that ceteris paribus privatisation leads to a more
efficient provision of goods and services. Yet, empirical studies often fail to distinguish
sufficiently between a change of ownership and other (often simultaneous) reforms,
such as liberalisation, the introduction of competition, deregulation, and divestiture.
Against this backdrop, and drawing on the results of an enormous body of literature,
this thesis attempts to shed light on the privatisation experience in industries, in
which, due to the presence of subadditive cost functions, externalities and universal
service obligations, the case for privatisation is less clear: infrastructure industries or
‘public’ utilities.
Despite a common theme, the thesis consists of three distinct papers: (1) ‘An
Empirical Analysis of Liberalisation and Efficiency in the British Rail Industry’, (2)
‘Reforming Utilities: The Empirics of Performance, Ownership and Liberalisation’,
and (3) ‘On Competition for the Market and the Cost of Truth Revelation with
Asymmetric Information’1. Although the research questions of each paper are related
because of similar underlying issues — perhaps best summarised as ‘Does privatisation
“work” in the presence of market failure?’ — each has a slightly different focus and
1Based on joint work with Jo¨rg Borrmann.
1
2follows a distinct methodological approach.
The first paper assesses the impact of private ownership and the introduction
of competition on cost efficiency in the British rail industry over a period of 40
years. The second paper addresses the question of how far regulatory regimes and
competition can account for post-privatisation improvements (found by the majority
of previous studies) across infrastructure industries. The third paper deals with more
specific issues which arise when attempting to introduce competition in an industry
with natural monopoly properties via the means of franchise bidding. The main focus
is on the optimal duration of such franchise contracts in the presence of asymmetric
information.
The two empirical studies on British railways and utilities respectively, both focus
on the performance of a privatised regime as opposed to a nationalised regime, while
attempting to account for the effects of competition and regulatory changes. The
panel data study on publicly and privately owned utilities relies on a random and fixed
effects model to account for industry and country specific factors. When looking at
the privatisation and restructuring of British Rail, descriptive statistics are applied
alongside a more formal econometric time series model. The theoretical paper on
franchise bidding develops an auction mechanism in a finite horizon model to reveal
the welfare-maximising contract length, even when the regulator is uninformed.
The thesis highlights the difficulties which can arise when infrastructure industries
are privatised. Findings suggest that competition and regulation play a crucial part
in determining whether a privatisation programme can be termed successful (with
regard to performance and other measures). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4,
some crucial factors, such as franchise length, have not been sufficiently dealt with in
3theory or practice.
In particular, research presented in this thesis shows that efficiency improvements
after the British Rail privatisation were short-lived, and that scale economies and
transaction costs may well have contributed to this performance decline. Secondly,
looking at a large scale sample across industries, this thesis finds that market reform
decreased the profitability of firms while efficiency with respect to investments increa-
sed. This is in line with economic theory which suggests that increases in competition
and market reform will make firms less profitable and more efficient. With respect to
ownership the results are less clear. After highlighting vastly different regulatory ap-
proaches with respect to monopoly franchise contract length, Chapter 4 shows that
it may be possible to design a mechanism which forces bidders to reveal the total
surplus-maximising contract length directly.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 examines the literature on
privatisation in particular relating to infrastructure privatisation. Chapter 2 analyses
the British rail industry between 1964 until the end of the first franchise period, while
Chapter 3 presents the panel data study on private and public utilities. The final
chapter of this thesis, based on joint work with Jo¨rg Borrmann, introduces an auction
mechanism, which can reveal the true optimal franchise duration in a setting with
informed bidders and an uninformed regulator.
Chapter 1
Does Ownership Matter? Evidence
from Infrastructure Industries
The first chapter will briefly outline theories on privatisation, followed by some new
evidence from empirical studies. In line with the title of this thesis, the focus is
on economic infrastructure: energy, postal services, telecommunications, transport
and water. A large body of literature attempts to find links between privatisation
and performance. It is by no means clear from the outset if, or how, privatisation
should influence economic performance. In addition, there are many different channels
through which privatisation may work. The emphasis will be on the models and
methods that have been adopted, as-well as possible problems researchers encounter
in attempting to test them. The chapter intends to set the scene for the theoretical
and empirical findings presented in the latter part of this thesis.
I Introduction
In economics privatisation has been studied across a wide variety of fields, from in-
formation economics over corporate governance to political economy, from finance to
4
5industrial organisation. The common ground can be summarised in a fairly straight-
forward fashion: How does privatisation work, why is it done, and what is the out-
come? These most general of questions are those that appear plausible in any policy
evaluation context. Yet, privatisation has attracted so much attention from scholars
(and politicians and the media alike, one might add) because the answers to these
questions can potentially feed another: How much should the state be involved in
the economy? In this sense one may view privatisation as just one tiny particle in
the liberalisation vs. protectionism universe, but even so, considering the spread of
privatisation around the world, it is undoubtedly one of the most universally adop-
ted pro-market reforms (which may well be because in general privatisation leads to
immediate benefits for any government: the proceeds from sale).
The global spread of privatisation programmes in the last three decades has been
impressive, to say the least. Between 2000 and 2006 low and middle income coun-
tries saw 1426 transactions, with a combined value of US$ million 104, 871.42 in 2006
alone.1 Over a third of these transactions can be attributed to the infrastructure
sector. In Europe, on the other hand, Privatization Barometer reports over 2000
transactions since the privatisation of British Petroleum in 1977 with proceeds total-
ling US$ million 53, 174.22 in 2006. In recent years, the data reveal a steady growth of
transactions in low and high income countries and, perhaps more surprisingly, a still
impressive number of transactions in Europe driven by privatisations in the finance
and utilities (mainly telecommunications) sector.2
The question of ownership and state involvement has been ever so prominent in
the history of economic analysis. One of the most quoted being Adam Smith (1776),
1Source: World Bank Privatization Database.
2Source: Privatization Barometer Database, http://www.privatizationbarometer.net.
6pleading that ‘. . . [al]though the profusion of government must, undoubtedly have
retarded the natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement, it has
not been able to stop it.’ However, Book V of The Wealth of Nations reveals that
Smith (1776) sees scope for public involvement, and implicitly ownership, not only in
defence and justice but also infrastructure (roads, harbours, bridges) and education.3
Schumpeter (1934) touches the subject of ownership when he discusses the nature
of entrepreneurship. While he remarks that private ownership is not central per
se, he does at the same time emphasise the importance of the capitalist ideas of
success and competition for the characterisation of the modern entrepreneur, other
economic arrangements, he concludes, may not produce the incentives necessary to
drive innovation and economic development:
. . . die Art, in der im kapitalistischen Leben “Sieg” und “Erfolg” gemessen wird
. . . ist durch ein anderes soziales Arrangement nicht leicht zu ersetzen, aber es ist
kein Widersinn nach einem solchen zu suchen. Zwar mu¨ßte in einer den privaten
Unternehmer ausschließenden sozialen Organisation nicht nur fu¨r sie Ersatz
gefunden werden, sondern weiter auch fu¨r jene Funktion des Unternehmers, die
er erfu¨llt, wenn er [sic] den gro¨ßten Teil seines Gewinns zuru¨cklegt statt ihn zu
verbrauchen;4(Schumpeter 1934, p.139)
Whether the archetype of the entrepreneur as envisaged by Schumpeter (1934)
is relevant for the type of infrastructure privatisations investigated in the literature
3His views on education are somewhat dated as he writes ‘There are no publick institutions
for the education of women, and there is accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in
the common course of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it
necessary or useful for them to learn; and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education
tends evidently to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their person,
or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to œconomy: to render them both
likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become such.’
(Smith 1776, p. 428)
4Author’s translation: . . . the way, in which “victory” and “success” are measured in capitalist
life . . . is not easily supplemented by an alternative social arrangement, but it is not futile to search
for it. Albeit, it would be necessary, for any social organisation excluding private entrepreneurs, not
only to replace it [this way], but also the function, which the entrepreneur fulfils, when he saves a
big part of his profit instead of spending it.
7presented below (typically large-scale programmes or sizeable companies) may be
questioned, yet, the central theme of competitive forces which fuel innovation is picked
up by economists seventy years later as a pro-privatisation argument (Shleifer 1998):
Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when in-
centives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is
the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the “dynamic vitality” of
free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s . . . ignored the
enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to in-
novate.5(pp.147-148)
Infrastructure industries, that is energy, postal services, telecommunications, trans-
port, and water, have repeatedly been at the centre of attention, when discussions of
state (during the 1940s), versus private (during the 1980s), versus state (during the
late 2000s) ownership were rife. A fact, which reflects, on the one hand, their econo-
mic importance and, on the other hand, that those industries are subject to different
types of market failure. Specifically, infrastructure industries tend to retain (even
when divested) a natural monopoly6 element, namely the network. One should point
out that the degree of market failure can by no means be assumed to be constant
over time. In telecommunications, for example, technological progress has decreased
the degree of natural monopoly typed market failure, whereas the importance of ex-
ternalities (greenhouse gas emissions, pollution, noise) in transport and energy has
dramatically increased, or at least the awareness thereof.
To put it differently, one could argue that infrastructure industries are the first to
be nationalised in a period of state involvement and the last to be privatised when pro-
market reforms are undertaken 7. Yet, private ownership in infrastructure industries
5Of course only time will tell if in 50 years this statement will read along the lines of “the great
economists of the 1980s and 1990s ignored the importance of contract uncertainty, externalities . . . ”
6This thesis assumes throughout that natural monopolies are characterised by subbaditive cost
functions, see Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1988).
7See for example the privatisation experience in Britain (Vickers & Yarrow 1988), Austria (Belke
8is by no means restricted to the large privatisation programmes of the 1980s and
1990s. The first sub-surface railway, the Metropolitan Railway, was privately owned
from 1863 until 1933, when it was taken over by the London Passenger Transport
Board (London Passenger Transport Act 1933). Similarly, when the first eighteen-
mile commercial flight took place in the United States in 1914, the government did not
appear to be interested at all. The regulation of airlines was not directly related to
concerns over market failure but the result of an initiative by the Post Master General
to establish a national air transportation system (Morrison & Winston 1995). The
history of private involvement in infrastructure is not restricted to transport alone,
the water and waste water sector in France has seen private participation for at least
one hundred years (Chong, Huet, Saussier & Steiner 2006).
This chapter will show that attempts to formally study privatisation are largely
based on political economy arguments. For infrastructure industries the focus is often
slightly different, with a particular focus on informational asymmetries and regulation.
The outline of the chapter is as follows: Section II will summarise the most important
theories on the impact of ownership on firm performance, not necessarily restricted
to infrastructure. In particular, the political economy literature will be contrasted
with alternative approaches. The third section looks at the empirical findings with
regard to firm performance and quality. Section IV offers some concluding remarks.
& Schneider 2004), or Ukraine (Estrin & Rosevear 1999).
9II Theoretical Underpinnings
Early 8 theoretical models approach privatisation (nationalisation) either from a mar-
ket failure perspective or from a political economy perspective. Models of the latter
do not usually take into account forms of market failure (such as externalities, natural
monopoly properties, public good properties etc.), whereas social welfare models miss
political aspects. First attempts to unite those two strands of the literature (Laffont
& Tirole 1993, Banerjee 1997) introduce an intermediate agent (e.g. a bureaucrat or
a regulator) who does not maximise social welfare but considers only his or her own
utility function, thereby keeping the market failure rationale for public ownership
while at the same time covering political economy facets.
(i) The Political Economy of Privatisation
The premise of political economy models is that state ownership implies an organisa-
tional structure whereby ownership is distinct from control. In principle, taxpayers as
the ultimate owners of state-owned enterprises have no direct way to exercise influence
on the managers controlling the firm (Mueller 2003). Depending on the discretion of
the government, managers may pursue goals largely unrelated to the maximisation
of taxpayers’ wealth. Shleifer & Vishny (1994) set out to explain the superior per-
formance of private and privatised firms by modelling the behaviour of managers in
state-owned enterprises. Their model shows that politicians prefer control (through
8The term ‘early’ may be slightly misleading with regard to the privatisation literature. In this
context I casually apply it to refer to early attempts to formally study privatisation in contemporary
economics which mainly evolved after the first privatisation programmes were launched during the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Hence, I will not mention more general discussions on the levels of state
or government involvement in the economy.
10
direct ownership or regulation) over manager control because it puts them in a better
position with regard to bargaining power. Thus, a firm with negative profits can
still be of positive value to a politician if she can win employee votes. Interestingly,
Shleifer & Vishny (1994) point out that their model gives a new explanation for the
existence of large national monopolies such as railroads, tobacco, or postal services.
These firms are under the control of politicians simply because they are large and,
hence, represent a large number of votes. The model serves well to illustrate the need
to account for politicians’ motivations, but at the same time any concern for market
failure or social welfare is irrelevant.
Between 1960 and 1980 the national monopolist British Rail employed on average
around 250,000 staff which can be considered a sizeable portion of the electorate
(especially once one adds staff numbers and their families9 for other nationalised
industries of that time). This raises the question why any politician would adopt
a privatisation programme. So, for politicians to be willing to privatise they have
to expect a high share in voters with preferences for low taxes and a low share of
voters who are in public employment. Such conditions would typically be fulfilled for
a right-wing or conservative government.
Such an explanation, however, fails to mention that there are some (in principle)
traceable and tractable reasons why the government gets involved: to mitigate the ef-
fects of market failure. From the wider perspective of misgovernance, Banerjee (1997)
explicitly allows for a benevolent government attempting to minimise the social costs
of market failure. The agency model rests on the assumption of a conflict of inter-
est within the government (namely bureaucrats and the government). This could
9One may even wish to draw comparisons to tribal voting as described in Mueller (2009).
11
be plausible to the extent that at a given time some politicians might be concerned
with welfare and others with maximising their own utility function. Such a distinc-
tion is common in the economics of regulation, namely between the government (or
politician) and the regulator. The conclusions are not encouraging because agency
problems within the government combined with market failure lead to red tape, cor-
ruption, and distorted incentives (Banerjee 1997).
In terms of outcomes, it appears less decisive whether it is bureaucrats who are
not interested in maximising social welfare or whether it is politicians. It is very easy
to imagine situations where one could observe both, a government trying to stay in
power by appealing to large parts of the electorate, and in addition prevailing agency
problems within the government, generating red tape, corruption, and inefficiency.
The existence of corruption may also be exploited by intermediary agents not directly
involved with the government apparatus (Hasker & Okten 2008).
From the political economy perspective, privatisation serves as an instrument to
curb political discretion and depoliticise the given firm or industry. This in turn leads
to an increase in efficiency, as vote-maximising politicians favour excess employment
(Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 1996). On the other hand, when property rights are
ill-defined, the state may exploit firms regardless of ownership status. Even when
property rights are strong, politicians may exercise influence to a certain degree,
for example through regulation. In this case, it can be shown that privatisation
weakens the ability and incentives of interest groups to influence political decision
making (Bennedsen 2000). Che & Qian (1998) demonstrate that when the risk of
expropriation is high, some form of (local) government ownership is preferable to
private ownership. In this instance, local governments are better equipped to deal
12
with state failure caused by institutional weaknesses.
Recent theoretical literature has again put some qualification on results derived
in the 1990’s (Besley & Ghatak 2001, Bo¨rner 2004, Biais & Perotti 2002). In the light
of increasingly negative assessments of some countries’ privatisation programmes and
experiences (e.g. Russia, or failed railway privatisation in Britain, Argentina and
Brazil), quality and pricing issues have emerged. In particular, they highlight the
potential for a combined presence of state and market failure.
If governments aim to maximise votes, then they use underpricing of privatisation
shares to attract voters, often through public issue. Revenue-maximising govern-
ments, on the other hand, will simply maximise their private monetary payoff. In
both cases, Bo¨rner (2004) shows that governments do engage in excessive privati-
sation to make profit or win votes. The model suggests that we should observe
underpricing. Therefore, predictions delivered by political economy models generally
differ due to the assumptions made concerning government behaviour. This in turn
raises one central question: What is (are) the government objective(s)? As far as
empirical evidence is concerned, there is evidence of underpricing and quality issues,
as-well as excess employment and inefficiency in SOEs.
It has of course been long recognised in the public choice literature that govern-
ments are not benevolent but are likely to maximise political support given financial
constraints (see Mueller (2003b)). If this is the case, it is unclear, why governments
should prefer state or private ownership, as most objectives, such as a redistributive
agenda, could be achieved through regulation. Governments may, therefore, weigh the
cost of regulation against the cost of transfer through state ownership (Rosa 1993).
In the next section we, thus, turn to regulation and contract theory as a supplemental
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explanatory route.
(ii) Alternative Approaches
The spread of privatisation programmes has also contributed to the renewal of two
strands of the literature: contract theory and the economics of regulation. For in-
frastructure industries, one of the defining contributions was Baumol et al. (1988)
who first systematically define crucial concepts such as “natural monopoly”. With
privatisation reaching infrastructure industries such as telecommunications and air-
lines, economists devised new systems of regulation (Littlechild 1984, Kahn 1988),
the most prominent being the rise of incentive regulation. Among the seminal reali-
sations of the new economics of regulation undoubtedly were that regulators (a) are
subject to informational asymmetries, and (b) need to be given the tools to enforce
regulatory contracts (Laffont & Tirole 1993). Theories on regulation are, therefore,
closely influenced by the findings of information economics and contract theory.
Under certain conditions, it has been shown that privatised and nationalised firms
need not differ if the government is benevolent and not tied up in agency conflicts
(Sappington & Stiglitz 1987, Williamson 1985, Banerjee 1997). Privatised firms may
be regulated into mitigating market failures, and a benevolent politician-owner may be
able to imitate the actions of a private owner. Given perfectly enforceable contracts
the government can be just as efficient as the private sector, whereas a privatised
firm can be just as social as the government. With incomplete contracts, on the
other hand, it is neither necessary to rely on political economy arguments and as-
sume a revenue/voter-maximising government nor agency problems between different
branches of state authorities –
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. . . our main results should be seen as an existence theorem: It shows that
privatization can be strictly superior to nationalization even in the best of all
worlds for the government. Thus, even if it were possible to perfectly fix all the
deficiencies of the political system, a case for privatization could still be made.
(Schmidt 1996, p. 4)[emphasis in original]
This result is based on seminal work by Grossman & Hart (1986) and Hart &
Moore (1988). Incomplete contract models for private/public ownership problems
look at potential hold-up problems between the government and firms or employees.
These models are particularly suited for evaluating private-public partnerships or
industries where the government still is involved, for example through regulation.
This hold-up problem is demonstrated in Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), where the
government-owner can hold-up the manager-employee without offering rewards as an
incentive. On the other hand, in the private ownership case the manager-owner is not
subject to hold-up. However, Hart et al. (1997), similarly, demonstrate that private
ownership may lead to lower quality investments or quality-shading. Hart (2003)
extends the analysis to public-private partnerships and highlights the importance of
appropriate performance measures.
Traditionally, regulation of public utility services focused on the rate level and,
albeit to a lesser extent, the level of quality (Kahn 1988). Typically for a public
utility, a monopoly’s limits were set with regard to a “fair” rate of return on capital.
However, Averch & Johnson (1962) demonstrate that rate-of-return regulation leads
to incentive problems. In particular, it has been shown that generally incentives
are distorted towards excessive capital-intensity, or “gold-plating” (Kahn 1988, Train
1991). In response, other types of regulatory mechanisms have been developed, most
prominently RPI-X regulation (Littlechild 1984). As a result, the focus of attention
shifted to the informational asymmetries between the regulator, as the principal, and
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the regulated firm, as the agent (Laffont & Tirole 1993).
Overall, theory suggests that although a strong case for privatisation can be built
on the foundations of the political economy/public choice literature some qualifica-
tions seem to arise from particularities in infrastructure industries. Thus, problems
such as quality shading may stand in the way of achieving “better” services. Never-
theless, advances in regulatory and contract theory point the way to regimes, which
have the potential to alleviate some of these problems. The next section will highlight
how these theoretical findings hold up when compared to empirical evidence.
III Empirical Evidence
Evidence on performance improvements after privatisation is summarised, amongst
others, by Megginson & Netter (2001) and Djankov & Murrell (2002). Generally, the
empirical evidence suggests that for a broad range of efficiency measures (Megginson,
Nash & van Randenborgh 1994, Dewenter & Malatesta 1997, Megginson, Nash, Net-
ter & Poulsen 2004, D’Souza, Megginson & Nash 2007) privatisation leads to per-
formance improvements. These studies, however, typically do not account for other
simultaneous market reforms such as regulatory reform, restructuring or the removal
of entry barriers. This section, therefore, sets out to highlight the findings particularly
relevant to the privatisation experience in infrastructure industries.
As a notable exception, D’Souza et al. (2007) compare pre-and post privatisation
performance for 161 firms over a period of 40 years, while taking regulatory reform
into account. In addition, they consider the possible sources of performance impro-
vements. They find that privatisation improves profitability, whereas restructuring
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and high employee share ownership increase the positive effect of privatisation. Post-
privatisation state ownership and foreign ownership lead to lower employment levels.
Overall, it appears that corporate governance drives post-privatisation improvements.
Although the paper uses a variety of methods (such as the Wilcoxon signed rank test
for change in means, or the Kurskal-Wallis test for differences between subsamples,
and OLS for sources of improvement), changes in regulation or competition are mea-
sured as a utility firm dummy only. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model is
quite weak (R¯2 = 0.04).
Looking at specific industries, researchers have attempted to analyse the direct and
indirect effect of reforms on a large variety of variables, from punctuality records for
public transport to sanitation and levels of child mortality. One of the first questions,
however, which arises relates to cost efficiency and prices in the industry. In general,
results show that for most industries privatisation and reform had a positive impact
on efficiency, especially in terms of costs, and, too a much lesser extent, a positive
impact on consumers, especially in terms of prices.
With regard to efficiency, the privatisation of electricity in England and Wales
appears to have led to permanent cost reductions of 5 per cent a year. However, this
fall in unit costs only led to increases in profits and was not passed on to consumers in
the form of reduced prices. In the sample period from 1986 to 1996 labour productivity
in the electricity sector outgrew the UK’s productivity growth (Newbery & Pollitt
1997). Andres, Foster & Guasch (2006) take a broader approach by analysing over
100 electric utilities in South America. They argue that while changes in efficiency
and employment are stark during the transition period, only modest improvements
can be observed thereafter. Interestingly, with regard to p
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There is also evidence that privatised utilities are more labour efficient. In Estache
& Rossi (2004) private electricity distribution companies use up to 45% less labour to
produce the same output as a public counterpart. Further, they suggest that price-
cap regulation appears to offer efficiency advantages over rate-of-return regulation or
hybrid schemes.
In some instances, costs savings seem to have been passed on to consumers. For
example, in the British telecom industry prices have halved after privatisation (Florio
2003). Other changes included the decrease in employment levels, which was, however,
accompanied by slight increases in wages. Most of the changes in financial, quality,
and price indicators are predominantly connected to liberalisation and regulatory
pressure rather than privatisation alone (Florio 2003). This result is also supported
by Bortolotti, D’Souza, Fantini & Megginson (2002) who analyse 31 national telecoms
and compare pre- and post-privatisation performance using and panel data analysis.
Again, performance improvements appear to be related to regulatory changes rather
than privatisation alone.
While findings on efficiency and profitability are largely positive, it appears to
be natural extension to attempt to investigate their cause. As pointed out in the
general privatisation literature, restructuring prior to privatisation is fairly common
(Megginson & Netter 2001). While in the European airline industry some airlines
show increases in labour profitability and productivity, it also appears to be the case
that these might be related to the deep restructuring measures taken and paid for
by the government, and ultimately the tax-payers, beforehand (Macchiati & Siciliano
2007).
Another way to approach the question of performance, and in particular efficiency,
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is to rely on non-parametric methods such as Data Envelopment Analysis (Charnes,
Cooper & Rhodes 1978). Recent studies focus on railways (Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard
& Kronborg 2009), airports (Domney, Wilson & Chen 2005), or water (Picazo-Tadeo,
Sez-Fernndez & Gonzlez-Gmez 2008). For European railways Asmild et al. (2009) find
that reforms improve operating efficiency. Distinguishing between operating efficiency
of material and staff, it is found that accounting separation and other reforms only
influence one or the other.
One methodological problem common to most industry-specific studies is the use
of the counterfactual. If, however, the sample is relatively large, econometric ap-
proaches can be used to mitigate this problem. Chong et al. (2006) look at the
French water industry, which, with its numerous local authorities, represents a prime
candidate for such advanced analysis. Using a sample of 5000 municipalities and a
switching regression model, they look at different contracting schemes for water pro-
vision used by those authorities. Contracts range from pure management contracts
to outright privatisation. They find that the choice of contract in each municipality
is not random, and that prices are higher when concessions are awarded in a public-
private partnership. On average, the difference in retail price is over 16 per cent
compared to public provision.
One important question in this context is not just which type of reform is chosen
(e.g. franchising versus competition in the market) but also the sequencing of reforms.
Using a large panel with data from almost 200 countries, Wallsten (2002) looks at the
impact of reform sequence on performance in the telecommunications sector. Relying
mainly on dummy variables, the author shows that the establishment of a regulator
prior to privatisation, and the existence of an independent regulator, have a positive
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impact on performance indicators, such as the number of mainlines, or the number of
mainlines per capita. A private ownership dummy variable, on the other hand, has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient with the number of mainlines as the
dependent variable, and a positive coefficient with the number of cellular subscribers
as the dependent variable. This peculiar result may be related to the timing of the
introduction of new technology and privatisation,10 and does not offer conclusive
evidence on the actual causal relationship between performance and privatisation.
Rather than focusing on firms or the industry as a whole, researchers have also
followed a microeconometric approach (Galiani, Gertler & Schargrodsky 2005, Chong
et al. 2006, Alcazar, Nakasone & Torero 2007). Analysing privatisation in the electri-
city sector in Peru, Alcazar et al. (2007) compare households in communities where
privatisation has taken place to those communities where it had not. Using a two-step
matching procedure to construct an empirical control group with similar characteris-
tics as the treatment group, they show that privatised providers offer a higher quality
of service. In addition to reporting a lower number of monthly blackouts, households
with a private provider reported lower prices. As a result, electricity consumption
was also higher compared to the control group.
The number and duration of blackouts are a standard indicator for electricity
service quality, similar, for example, to the number of mobile subscribers for telecoms
or the number of trains arriving on schedule for railways. In telecommunications,
privatisation appears to have a positive impact on efficiency and quality indicators,
such as network expansion (Ros 1999, Ros 2000). However, the underlying assumption
10It could of course be argued in a Schumpeterian fashion, that technological progress was made
possible through private entrepreneurship, but econometric analysis in Wallsten (2002) does not rule
out that results are coincidental.
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in the use of such indicators, from a total-surplus maximising point of view, has to be
that the optimum has not yet been reached. It is unlikely, however, that for quality
indicators, “perfection”, such as 100% punctuality or zero blackouts, maximises total
welfare.
With such considerations, it seems maybe natural to look at the effect of reform
beyond such quality indicators. Again, relying on household level data Galiani et al.
(2005) try to link the privatisation of water and waste water services to child mor-
tality. In a difference-in-differences microeconometric analysis, the paper establishes
that water privatisation lowered child mortality in Argentina. Subsequent franchise
terminations, such as in Buenos Aires, put theses results under new scrutiny.
IV Conclusion
This chapter attempted to highlight some of the most important theoretical and
empirical results relevant for privatisation of economic infrastructure. The main issue
at stake is brought to the point in the title of Newbery & Pollitt’s (1997) paper ‘The
Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain’s Cegb – Was it Worth It?’. Clearly, with
instances of extensive restructuring and deregulation in mind, it is not only legitimate
but obligatory to ask this question.
From a political economy point of view, it has been shown that privatisation or
nationalisation can both be interpreted as means to a simple end, which is to win
as many votes as possible. While incentive and incomplete contract problems within
governments, for example between the bureaucrat and the manager are relevant, at
the core the separation of ownership and control remains the biggest problem. Tax-
payers evidently have (almost) no control over actions, accounts, investments, etc.
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of state-owned enterprises. They are presented with the extreme difficulty of having
to evaluate, as the ultimate owners, not just firm performance but, if they aim to
maximise their utility, how a particular firm’s performance fits into the entire realm
of government expenditures.
In the case of infrastructure industries, subadditive costs, universal service obliga-
tions, externalities, and the reliance on limited and unevenly distributed resources,11
make the design of suitable privatisation or liberalisation policies especially difficult.
The economics of regulation has aimed to tackle at least some of these problems. The
rise of incentive regulation and price caps has meant that the inefficient use of capi-
tal, or “gold-plating”, is less common. On the other hand, there are still numerous
open question, for instance with regard to investments, benchmarking, or franchise
bidding. Chapter 4 will give an example of how theoretical models can help to solve
practical issues, in this case the optimal franchise duration.
In empirical work, case studies often do find increases in financial performance
after privatisation or deregulation in a number of infrastructure industries. Attention
is also given to possible reasons for such improvements, since evidence indicates that
different types of reforms have a different impact. Evidence on other issues such
as quality or employment remains sketchy. Falling in line with other case studies,
Chapter 2 aims to provide a thorough analysis of the British railway industry.
It is also clear that accounting for ownership changes and regulatory reform in
infrastructure is extremely difficult in empirical work. Often data limitations and
other methodological problems impede the inclusion of different industries. Although
industry studies have the distinct advantage to assess the impact of reform on a more
11Natural gas or water come to mind.
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sophisticated level, Chapter 3 aims to take a more general approach, and analyses per-
formance, ownership, and reform across different infrastructure industries over time.
Taken together this thesis contributes to the research area of economic infrastructure
with a case study of British railways, a cross-industry, large-scale panel data model,
and a theoretical model on the optimal duration of franchise bidding contracts. It is
also clear from the survey presented above, that many important research questions
above, and beyond, performance still need to be addressed, such as the timing of
reform, quality, investments, or employment effects.
Chapter 2
An Empirical Analysis of
Liberalisation and Efficiency in the
British Rail Industry
This chapter analyses the privatisation and restructuring experience in one of the last
strongholds of state provision of infrastructure services in Great Britain: passenger
railway services. Providing a detailed survey of railway literature, the analysis draws
on an extensive database of the British rail industry from 1964, to the end of the
first franchising period in 2005/06. Economic theory and descriptive statistics help
to motivate an econometric approach, which sheds light on the most important deter-
minants of cost efficiency over the 40 year period. A particular focus of the analysis
is industry performance after the restructuring period of 1994-97. Results suggest
that while initially successful in improving cost efficiency, the effect evaporated over
time. Further, estimated coefficients emphasise the importance of competition and
economies of density in the British sample.
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I Introduction
The economic analysis of rail transport has a long-standing and thriving tradition
(Wellington 1893, Lorenz 1916, Acworth 1922). One of the reasons why railway econo-
mics has such a sustained history is that railroads have some particular characteristics,
which make them analytically challenging, and at the same time a prime candidate
for policy debates: Railroads as an infrastructure industry exhibit natural monopoly
properties, sunk costs, and limited scope for competition. Moreover, railways receive
public funding, and act as a potential substitute for road and air transport, while
generating comparatively fewer externalities, such as pollution (noise and air) and
congestion. Thus, the paper addresses a number of broader issues, while of course,
being sensitive to the limitations applying to any case study.
In European countries most railways have been state-run at least since World
War II, and despite their perceived inefficiency, little was set to change until, on July
29th 1991, a EU Council Directive was released, which required the separation of
railway infrastructure from operations and mandated the introduction of competition
in construction, maintenance, and provision of services:
The aim of this Directive is to facilitate the adoption of the Community railways
to the needs of the Single Market and to increase their efficiency;
- by ensuring the management independence of railway undertakings;
- by separating the management of railway operation and infrastructure
from the provision of railway transport services, separation of accounts
being compulsory and organizational or institutional separation being op-
tional,
- by improving the financial structure of undertakings,
- by ensuring access to the networks of Member states for international
groupings of railway undertakings and for railway undertakings engaged
in the international combined transport of goods.
(Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991: Article 1)
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Further, the Directive required that
Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the accounts for
business relating to the provision of transport services and those for business
relating to the management of railway infrastructure are kept separate. Aid
paid to one of these two areas of activity may not be transferred to the other.
The accounts for the two areas of the activity shall be kept in a way which
reflects this prohibition. Member States may also provide that this separation
shall require the organization of distinct divisions within a single undertaking
or that the infrastructure shall be managed by a separate entity.
(Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991: Article 6)
Although not directly propagating the introduction of private ownership, the di-
rective laid down the basis of any such future development: The separation of in-
frastructure from operations (at least in accounts) – thereby separating the natural
monopoly element from the potentially competitive element. In principle, this allows
for, either the introduction of competition with the state incumbent (as for example in
the case of AT&T or BT), or the divestiture and subsequent privatisation of the state
monopoly (as for example in the case of electricity unbundling). One year after the
release of the directive, in July 1992, the UK White Paper New Opportunities for the
Railways was published by the Department of Transport. These new opportunities
were meant to arise from the introduction of private management and liberalisation of
the sector. The steps that were consequently undertaken by the government of John
Major between 1994 and 1997 were the most radical to be introduced in Europe, up
to today. Although there has been some movement back to a less market-oriented ap-
proach (e.g. the creation of a new infrastructure manager that runs as a non-for-profit
company rather than publicly listed company, such as the original infrastructure ma-
nager), the complete separation of infrastructure and most types of operations (i.e.
passenger and freight services, rolling stock provision, infrastructure services, etc.), is
still in place.
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One central question raised by major policy changes such as the restructuring
and subsequent divestiture of the former state monopolist British Rail, is whether
efficiency improvements as a result of liberalisation efforts can be observed. Although
Chapter 1 argues that the political economy literature on privatisation emphasises
that policy makers may pursue a range of different goals (Perotti 1995, Bennedsen
2000), efficiency is a key argument forwarded (by economists and politicians alike)
in favour of a more liberalised, privately dominated, market structure. Whilst this
question has been investigated, and possibly answered affirmatively, to a great extent
in the general privatisation literature (Megginson et al. 1994, Megginson & Netter
2001), the impact of liberalisation measures on efficiency in industries subject to
market failure is less certain.
In particular, in industries, which continue to exhibit strong natural monopoly
properties, liberalisation, and specifically horizontal and vertical separation, may lead
to a deterioration of observed efficiency (Estache, Gonza´les & Trujillo 2002). One of
the main reasons is that rail infrastructure is subject to sunk costs, since when demand
falls, parts of the network cannot easily be transferred to another geographical market.
Therefore, the network typically remains a bottleneck and can, thus, only be separated
from the potentially competitive rail services. This divestiture in turn may lead to
inefficiencies because the vertically and horizontally separated rail industry may give
rise to increases in transaction costs (Williamson 1976) and incomplete contracts
problems (Grossman & Hart 1986, Hart & Moore 1988).
Therefore, more specific questions arise in the context of the privatisation and
restructuring of railways. Do vertical economies matter in a separated rail industry? If
so, how large is their impact on cost efficiency? Is competition for monopoly effective
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in decreasing expenditure per unit of output? Does one of those effects dominate
the other? Beyond those issues of efficiency and competition, key questions typically
also surround the development of safety and employment issues in a liberalised rail
industry.
There are two main reasons to look at the railway industry in Great Britain.
Firstly, the process of privatisation and events ever since (i.e. high-profile accidents,
effective renationalisation of the infrastructure manager) gave rise to heated discus-
sions, within and far beyond academia, whether the privatisation of British Rail was
too hasted or even unnecessary. Secondly, very few other railways have followed
the UK example, and attempted a separation of tracks and rolling stock operations.
The more common policy is to split the private monopoly into several freight and
passenger units, which enjoy quasi local monopolies.
In this chapter, I develop a time series model that is based on a general-to-specific
and a Bayesian econometric approach. An artificially integrated operator is created
for the period of the liberalised regime to compare pre- and post privatisation per-
formance, measured as costs per unit of output. The paper is structured as follows.
Section II outlines the framework for the analysis, and discusses the key models with
regard to rail liberalisation. Section III offers a brief overview of the sample and data
collection methods, and outlines the methodology that will be applied in this paper.
Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes.
II Framework for Analysis
Empirical and theoretical literature on the economics of railways can at least be traced
back to the 19th century (Wellington 1893). Early post WWII empirical studies of
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railroad costs mainly focused on excess capacity and the difference between long-
run and short-run costs. The great interest in the estimation of the magnitude of
economies of density was related to the United States regulatory system (for trucking
and rails) of the time, which led to concerns over the misallocation between different
modes of transport. Therefore, one goal of those studies was to show that for light
density lines road haulage provides the cheaper alternative. In the last thirty years
technological advances (that is speed improvements, further electrification) combined
with greater awareness of environmental externalities have rendered some of those
early arguments less decisive.
(i) Examining Railroad Costs
Modern econometric studies of railway costs start with Borts (1954) and Borts (1960).
Borts (1960) estimates a cost function of the form
C = β1Q+ β2L/Q+ ε, (II.1)
where Q is car miles and L is total carloads. Specifying total costs as C(y) =
f(Q, L
Q
) assumes that the correct measure for rail freight output is miles and load per
mile, taking into account both the length and size of haul. Later studies typically
use freight tone miles (or kilometres) as an output measure. Using a sample of 61 US
freight railway firms, he finds that marginal costs of freight carloads, β1, to be $.25
in the Eastern Region, $.16 in the Southern Region and $.18 in the Western region.
He also estimates the equation using within regressions of firm size, which does not
lead to statistically different estimates of marginal costs with respect to size. The
large difference in the marginal cost estimates between the Eastern Region and the
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other two regions is attributed to higher traffic densities. Further, average costs are
higher than marginal costs in the South and West but not in the Eastern region.
An interesting exercise in this context uses his results to compute returns to scale,
defined as
S =
C(y)
yC ′(y)
=
AC(y)
MC(y)
. (II.2)
Substituting Borts’s (1960) estimates in II.2 it can be shown that small firms have
higher increasing returns to scale and that large Eastern firms have constant returns
to scale. This is in line with the central point emphasised by Lorenz (1916), which is
that density as a source of scale economies cannot go on ‘in infinitum’ (ibid., p.211),
as full capacity is reached. Therefore, one implication is that economies of density will
most likely be a relevant factor for regional and less congested railways but peripheral
for urban commuter lines where capacity is already fully utilised.
Building on the Borts (1960) study, the 1970s and 1980s produced a large number
of cost studies, concluding that one should distinguish between economies of size
and economies of density as a source of economies of scale. In the short run, when
capacity is fixed, the utilisation existing capacity (cars, tracks ...) to full capacity is
called economies of density. This source of scale economies will cease, once existing
resources are congested. Economies of size, on the other hand, refer to increases of
capacity (doubling a track, larger rolling stock) without the duplication of all inputs,
which potentially could go on forever. The majority of cost studies, however, assume
that capacity is fixed, and do not estimate economies of size.
Again, relying on the US freight sample, Griliches (1972) finds that returns to
scale vary between 1.35 and 1.03, depending on the size deflation factor used. When
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more weight is given to small railroads, increasing returns to scale are found. In
the undeflated model he finds constant returns to scale. His results support earlier
studies, in particular the hypothesis that economies of density are only one possible
source of scale economies. Thus, in principle, it appears to be important to account
for different types of economies of scale. On the other hand, empirical studies struggle
to find a suitable measure for economies of size.
Yet, the central motivation of cost studies on the U.S. freight industry was not
primarily to obtain estimates of economies of scale or economies of density but esti-
mates of excess capacity, while building ‘a powerful case against railroad regulation
in its present form’ (Levin 1981, 1). Friedlaender (1971), for example, looks at the
costs of regulation by estimating long and short run elasticities for 88 railroads, and
puts the costs of excess capacity of around $3 billion1. Keeler (1974) estimates rail
cost functions, and finds 200,000 miles, or 320,000 kilometres, of excess track capa-
city in a cross-section of 51 American railroads, a figure, which can be compared to
the total US rail network of 226,427 kilometres in 20072. Criticism for previous cost
models comes from Harris (1977) for omitting variables and using misspecified output
measures but he also calls for the closure of almost half of all US freight lines. He
suggests estimating average costs as
TC
Y
= AC = β1 + β2
1
AL
+ β3
1
DENS
, (II.3)
where output, Y , is defined as revenue tone miles, AL is the average length of haul
and density is measured as output divided by network size. The inverse relationship
1Roughly $8 billion in 2009 USD, with an average inflation rate of 3.2%.
2Source: CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook
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between average costs and density is derived through the basic cost model, which
includes network size as an explanatory variable. With a cross-section model of the
US freight industry, where companies differ with regard to network size, it is necessary
to take this into account when estimating a cost function.
In a first attempt to approach the problem of heterogeneous qualities and at-
tributes of rail outputs, Spady & Friedlaender (1978) use an hedonic cost function.
Estimating average costs using an hedonic specification, yields an average cost curve,
which rises as output grows, so that large firms have higher average costs than small
rail freight firms. The approach points towards a possible explanation for the mergers
of small and large railway firms of the time. The implication of Spady & Friedlaender
(1978) is that quality criteria, such as punctuality, should be taken into account when
estimating railroad costs.
With increasing concerns over the financial situation of many U.S. railways, de-
regulation was conjured up as a possible solution, and in 1980 the Staggers Rail Act
was passed. These possible positive effects are simulated in Levin (1981). He looks at
the potential effects of deregulation on profitability and railway rates. Some degree
of competition, i.e. setting ρ = n/k = 3, where n is the number of firms, k is the
change in industry output a firm believes to result from a one unit change in output,
will lead to rates of return on replacement value of 4% to 8% and rate increases of
around 10% to 80%. These large differences in tariffs are a result of the regulatory
regime at the time, with different tariffs being set for different goods. The predicted
rise in profits and prices depends crucially on the assumed elasticity of demand and
the degree of competition used in the simulation.
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The rise of the translog cost-function,
lnC =
N∑
i=1
α lnXi + 1/2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αij lnXi lnXj + ε, (II.4)
allowed for specifications of multiple inputs, X1, . . . , Xn, and, yet, after the de-
regulation of US railways, interest in the subject faded. Nevertheless, the literature
documents that the estimation of rail cost functions is by no means a straightforward
undertaking.
Major issues arise with respect to the source of economies of scale, which, on the
one hand, is related to the optimal utilisation of existing resources and, on the other
hand, to the expansion of services. Furthermore, flexibility in cost functions, such
as allowing for nonlinearities and interactions, has furthered understanding railway
costs. In view of the analysis presented in the latter part of this chapter, heterogeneity,
especially quality of service, should not be omitted from any cost model.
After recent reforms taking place in rail sectors around the world, the focus of
new studies shifted to the effects of deregulation and policy changes (Wilson 1994,
Estache et al. 2002). Whereas Wilson (1994) concentrates on the effect of deregulation
on prices, Estache et al. (2002) look at total factor productivity as a measure for
efficiency. Wilson (1994) finds an increase in average rates post US deregulation
of 10%, which is at the lower end of earlier predictions (Levin 1981). Experiences
in Argentina and Brazil are also mixed. Although the evaluation of total factor
productivity shows large efficiency gains, TFP growth is due to improvements in
outputs not inputs. Moreover, there appears to be large scope for strategic behaviour
when concessions are awarded (Estache et al. 2002). This chapter attempts to merge
the tradition of estimating railroad costs with newer approaches, which focus on the
impact of liberalisation.
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(ii) Competition for Monopoly: Franchise Bidding
When an industry contains monopolistic (track and stations) as well as potentially
competitive elements, there are two major options for a decision maker. The first is
to restructure prior to privatisation, and force the integrated incumbent to divest or,
alternatively, keep the vertically integrated monopolist, and regulate the incumbent
in a way that fosters competition and entry. The former strategy was, for example,
adopted in the British electricity market and the latter in the British telecommuni-
cations market (for an overview of the early privatisation programme in Britain see
Vickers & Yarrow (1988)). Vickers (1995) models this setting in the presence of im-
perfect competition and imperfect information. He shows that, depending on demand
conditions, separation or integration might be preferable.
One of the criticisms of the divestiture approach (i.e. breaking up the vertically
integrated firm and prohibiting the owner of an essential facility to participate in the
competitive business) is the presence of vertical economies. Often decision makers
have, therefore, opted for the less radical option of letting the vertically integrated
incumbent continue operations while simultaneously regulating access charges and
fostering some competition. This is an approach characteristic of early privatisa-
tion attempts of UK utilities prior to BR (Vickers & Yarrow 1988). The separation
of different stages of production, on the one hand, and distribution, on the other
hand, implies that transfer and connection costs arise, which would not apply to an
integrated monopolist.
Williamson (1971) offers an early attempt to systematically show the attracti-
veness of vertical integration and internalisation. Sources of vertical economies can
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include costly contractual arrangements, coordination failures in the provision of ser-
vices (which is particularly relevant for the rail industry), costly market transfers,
information problems, and a higher degree of uncertainty and risk aversion. Ka-
serman & Mayo (1991) develop and examine a model of vertical economies in the
electricity industry, and detect the presence of significant vertical cost complemen-
taries. Empirical evidence from Jensen & Stelling (2005) finds significant vertical
economies for the Swedish rail industry.
If the decision making authority opts for vertical and horizontal separation of
services, there is still the question what exact shape competition might take. In the
railway industries, direct competition on the track is rare, as technological limitations
apply. To be specific, only one service can run on a particular track at a given time,
which differs considerably from, say telecommunications, where calls can be made
simultaneously. Of course different allocation mechanisms could be envisaged, for
example the auctioning of railway slots.
Such a regime may not be practical and fairly costly, so that an alternative is
to award regional monopoly concessions to rail operators, as in the British case.
The merits of franchise bidding for the right to monopolise were highlighted in a
seminal discussion by Demsetz (1968). Early formal models on the optimal design of
franchise auctions include Laffont & Tirole (1987) and Riordan & Sappington (1987).
However, empirical tests seldom address the effectiveness of franchise bidding in a
public utility setting. This is regrettable as the success (failure) of vertical separation
and divestiture of a network industry largely depends on the (un)successful attempts
to introduce competition in the downstream (operations) sector.
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Criticism with regard to franchise bidding arose from the transaction cost litera-
ture (Williamson 1971, Williamson 1976, Goldberg 1976). The main difficulty thus
uncovered, relates to the transferral of long-lived assets at the end of the franchise
period. In particular, an incumbent will have an incentive to overestimate the va-
lue of the infrastructure assets so as to ensure a significant pay-off from the entrant.
Extending franchise periods to the life of the assets, which for railway locomotives
exceed 50 years, will raise other concerns, such as uncertainty and renegotiation. In
addition, franchise bidding, as a repeated auction, faces commonly discussed issues,
such as attracting a sufficient number of bidders or the prevention of collusion.
New empirical and theoretical contributions, however, try to investigate poten-
tial (practical) problems with franchise bidding and offer solutions (Engel, Fischer &
Galetovic 1997, Harstad & Crew 1999, Crew & Kleindorfer 2002, Borrmann 2008).
Indeed, Chapter 4 represents a similar attempt by analysing optimal franchise dura-
tion. Nevertheless, it remains the case that competition for monopoly is not without
drawbacks.
As a further complication, when analysing franchising in the British railway
context, it should be noted that the franchise bidding process in Britain can only
loosely be termed a franchise auction in the economic sense suggested by theory.
Since the start of the new framework, there has been a degree of uncertainty sur-
rounding the exact process for franchising. From 1996 onwards, franchises have first
been awarded by the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), from 2001 by
the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and then jointly by the SRA and the Department
for Transport (DfT).
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The franchises are awarded on the basis of the base services specification, bid-
der’s priced options, and bidder-generated options. Pre-qualified bidders receive an
Invitation to Tender (ITT), which sets out the frequency of service, and other es-
sential requirements. Bidders are invited to set out a delivery plan for reliability,
cost reduction, and revenue increase. Decisions are based on a Value for Money ap-
praisal, which includes factors like risk management. The first round of franchise
auctions was characterised by optimistic bids by prospective operators, resulting in a
number of renegotiations and one early termination of the South Eastern franchise.
Nevertheless, even the British franchising process does introduce some competition
(or contestability rather) and, therefore, needs to be evaluated.
(iii) The Privatisation of Railways in Great Britain
The privatisation process and its shortcomings have been investigated in some detail
(Curwen 1997, Gourvish 2002, Nash 1993, Nash 2002, Pollitt & Smith 2002). The
account presented in this chapter captures some of the background and lesser known
events.
From 1948 until 1997 the British Transport Commission (BTC) and later the Bri-
tish Railways Board (eventually trading as British Rail) was responsible for running
and maintaining the British railroad system, with a few notable exceptions such as
London Underground and some regional light railways and tramways. The powers
granted to the BTC with the Transport Act of 1947 ranged from carrying passengers
by rail, road, and waterway, to store and consign goods, from buying and leasing land,
to construction and maintenance. The main limitations regarding the production of
road vehicles and taxis were that,
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the commission shall not have power to carry passengers by road in a hackney
carriage adapted to carry less than eight passengers and used in plying or
standing for hire in a street.
(Transport Act 1947, Chapter 49, p. 3)
The focus of the Transport Act was
to provide, or secure, or promote the provision of, an efficient, adequate, eco-
nomical and properly integrated system of public inland transport and port
facilities within Great Britain for passengers and goods with due regard to sa-
fety of operation; ... Provided that the references in this subsection to transport
do not include references to transport by air. (Transport Act 1947, Chapter 49,
p. 8)
In a contemporary analysis of the piece of legislation, Walker (1948) focuses on
road transport and haulage, and does not dwell on railway reforms. His conclusions
reflect a sense of uncertainty on the impact of the Act on the British transport system
but, more importantly, he reflects on the nature of public enterprises and questions
the motives of managers:
... the Commission and their servants, directed to act only in the “national
interest,” would automatically be freed thereby from those malpractices, which
have so often disgraced private monopoly in the pursuit of profit. But even
should we be satisfied on that point, we must still enquire whether the quali-
ties, which make these fears groundless are also those which make for business
success in an enterprise as vast as that which the Commission and Executives
are being called upon to manage. (Walker 1948, 30)
So, even if the managers of the SOE, that is the Commission and their servants,
are able to act independently and strive to maximise consumer surplus, this may not
be compatible with the goal of running an enterprise efficiently.
In the following 45 years of state-owned railways the whole transport industry
underwent considerable transformation. These changing circumstances found their
first major manifestation in The Reshaping of British Railways (British Railways
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Board 1963), a report outlining a programme of station closures, rolling stock reduc-
tions, and network shrinkage. Even though the recommendations set out in the report
were largely followed, the financial success (that is a largely unsubsidised railway) en-
visioned at the beginning of the 1960s, did not materialise (Serpell 1983, 7). In his
report for the Department of Transport on railway finances, Serpell (1983) stresses
that further substantial route closures would be needed to result in passenger services
breaking even. As a consequence, the report outlines different scenarios depending
on the level of grants and subsidies a government would be willing to provide.
These concerns over the financial viability of rail services during the late 1970s and
early 1980s coincided with the launch of a large scale privatisation programme in 1979
by the government of Margaret Thatcher. Whereas the first wave of privatisations
concentrated on selling firms in competitive industries and included firms like British
Petroleum, Britoil, Cable and Wireless, British Aerospace, Jaguar, and Rolls Royce,
the mid-eighties saw a rising number of privatised utilities such as British Telecom,
British Gas, British Airways, British Airport Authority, and the electricity and water
supply industries (Vickers & Yarrow 1988). Even though Vickers & Yarrow’s (1988)
analysis of the UK privatisation describes the privatisation of British Rail as a remote
prospect due to the limited scope for competition and significant sunk costs, first ideas
to privatise the British railway system started to appear at the end of the 1980s. In
1989 a privatisation studies group was put in place by the British Railways Board to
analyse the possible options for privatisation and the Board’s response.3
By the time John Major took over from Margaret Thatcher in 1992, British Rail
was one of the last big state-owned enterprises left. One year later the Railways
3The protocols and minutes of this study group have been transferred to the National Archives
in Kent, and can be publicly accessed.
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Act (Railways Act 1993) set out the proposal for the restructuring of the British rail
industry, and the complete divestiture of British Rail into over 100 companies. The
Act provides the basis for the new industry structure and the responsibility of the
main actors (a summary is provided in Table I). The transfer of ownership of all of
British Rail businesses was completed in 1997, just before the general election.
Table I: Major Industry Participants in 1997
Name Abbreviation Main Responsibilities
Train Operating
Companies
TOC(s) Running of passenger services as set out
in the franchise contract.
Freight Operating
Companies
FOC(s) Running of freight services.
Rolling Stock Lea-
sing Companies
ROCSO(s) Leasing of rolling stock to freight and
train operating companies.
Office of Passenger
Rail Franchising
OPRAF Prepare invitations to tender, award
franchising contracts, secure services if
no franchisee can be found or a fran-
chise terminates early.
Railtrack Operating all track and infrastructure,
timetabling, operating signalling sys-
tems; Required to contract out main-
tenance and similar operations if value
for money.
Health and Safety
Executive
HSE Regulation of safety.
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Table I (continued)
Name Abbreviation Main Responsibilities
Office of Rail Regu-
lation
ORR Promote interoperability, foster compe-
tition, monitor prices, quality, access
rights and safety.
Source: Railways Act 1993 and the White Paper New Opportunities for the Railways 1992.
Since 1997 the rail industry has undergone many changes and some fundamental
restructuring. In October 2002, after Railtrack was put into administration, the in-
frastructure manager was effectively renationalised as Network Rail, a non-for-profit
company accountable to public and industry members as-well as the Department for
Transport. Between 2006 and 2008 the majority of original franchises had come to
an end and, thus, had to be refranchised. However, the Department for Transport
undertook a re-evaluation of franchise duration and size, and concluded that fran-
chise areas should be larger and franchise periods should last longer – the franchises
awarded 2006-2008 run between 7 to 10 years and, effectively, split Great Britain into
18 (as of June 2008) franchises only, instead of the original 25. Exceptions in the
refranchising were the Chiltern franchise, which was franchised to Deutsche Bahn for
19 years and the Merseyrail 25 year franchise, which was awarded to Serco Group
and NED Railways in July 20034.
4Source: For a detailed description see for example the National Audit Office (Office 2008)
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III Data and Methodology
(i) The Data
The data collected for this research mainly stem from the National Archives in Kew
(where British Railways Boards documents were transferred to), from the Depart-
ment for Transport and the industry regulators: Office of Passenger Rail Franchi-
sing (OPRAF), Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR), Strategic Rail Authority (SRA),
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Rail and Safety Standards Board (RSSB).
Additional firm information was obtained from the firms themselves and the FAME
database, which contains information on UK and Irish companies and businesses.
The documentations and publications, which were used to construct the data base,
fall into eight categories: (1) audited financial statements; (2) industry consultations;
(3) policy reports; (4) firm prospectuses; (5) internal memoranda between officials;
(6) quarterly and annual statistical publications; (7) evaluations of franchise perfor-
mance; (8) press and statutory notices; and (9) industry reports.
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Table II: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Min Median Mean Max St.dev
Network Size (km) 14300 14409 14941 20327 1231.06
Passenger Stations 2355 2483 2544 4145 338.93
Station Spacing 4.904 5.998 5.901 6.138 0.2418
Passenger Kilometres (m) 27358 30818 32084 41800 3658.07
Loaded Train Kilometres (m) 292.5 332 343.3 458.4 47.38
Expenditurea 178212 1274454 1964273 5879046 1967383
Infrastructure Expenditure 162229 970845 1091576 3393000 886213
Number of Staffb 44086 151323 166761 439551 9746.17
Staff Expenditureb 307900 1272773 1285811 2649848 754068
Directors’ Remuneration 94.73 393.52 2738.84 16012.27 4832.79
Total Government Supportc 120125 847000 1054659 3791000 900642
Punctualityc (per cent) 76.19 89.33 87.98 93.00 4.16
Trains Cancelledc (per cent) 0.74 1.33 1.46 3.20 0.0061
Train Agec (years) 15.35 21.14 20.88 23 1.67
Fatality Rate 0.1740 0.7015 0.7480 2.8168 0.4773
Fires on Trains 128 192 212 344 61.78
Train Accidents 863 1207 1176 1501 169.55
Diesel and Steam Rolling Stock (per cent) 30.08 50.05 49.41 76.74 12.71
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Table II (continued)
Variable Min Median Mean Max St.dev
Electrification (per cent) 9.35 22.35 23.45 32.92 6.71
Investmentc 449000 939000 1639895 4722000 1285622
Rolling Stock Investmentc 47000 329000 433632 1923000 432578
Petroleum Consumption (kg per km) 0.0137 0.0278 0.0286 0.0498 0.0144
Notes: All financial items are reported in real terms, £000s. Variables originally reported in miles were converted
to kilometres using the factor 1.6093.
(a) Expenditure assigned to the provision of passenger Services only, excludes Infrastructure and Freight.
(b) Staff Numbers and expenditure for 1994 and earlier include all BRB staff, and are not strictly comparable to
figures from 1994 onwards, as they only include staff employed in passenger service and infrastructure provision.
(c) Some observations missing
44
The database includes data for all original 25 passenger franchises, Railtrack,
Network Rail, and the British Railways Board (BRB) over 43 years from 1964 until
the time the first franchises expired in 2005. After a change in accounting standards
in 1983, the years from 1984 correspond to the financial year 1983/1984, or 2004
to the financial year 2003/2004, etceteras. Although the limited number of cross
section observations would generally be problematic for estimation, in this particular
case the sample represents the entire population of train operating companies in
Britain (including non-franchised services like Heathrow Express). The variables in
the database and their description can be found in Table III. Firm, industry and
franchise characteristics are arranged in groups: (1) production; (2) competition; (3)
employment; (4) government support; (5) incentives; (6) quality; (7) safety; and (8)
liberalisation.
Table III: Description of the Variables
Variable Group Variable Name Description
Production DENS Output, that is passenger kilometres in
000s, divided by network size in kilo-
metres.
AC Operating costs divided by passenger
kilometres
LOAD Average number of passengers per train
INV Investment in track, renewals, new
routes and electrification, signalling,
buildings, plants and equipment (ex-
penditure on fixed assets, excluding de-
preciation).
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Table III (continued)
Variable Group Variable Name Description
Competition
FRAN Number of franchises in year t.
COMP Number of companies in the industry in
year t (i.e. franchise holders) divided by
FRAN .
Employment STAFF Number of staff employed.
WAGES Annual wages and salaries.
Government
Support
GRANT Franchise grants.
SUB Subsidy payments (= grants) in 000s
by central Government and PTEs, from
1974 under the PSO; does not include
other grants.
Incentives
PAY DIR Remuneration of Directors.
Quality
AGE Average train age.
PERF Number of services delayed by more
than 5 or 10 minutes.
CANCEL Number of services. cancelled
ELECTRIC State of electrification of the network.
ENERGY Petroleum dependence, measured as
consumption in gramm per passenger
kilometre.
Safety
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Table III (continued)
Variable Group Variable Name Description
FATAL Fatalities per train kilometre (excluding
trespasses classified as suicides).
ACCIDENTS Number of train accidents per train ki-
lometre (includes fires, excludes broken
windscreens).
FIRE Number of accidents caused by out-
break of fires on trains.
Liberalisation
LIB Dummy variable equal to 1 from 1994
onwards, 0 otherwise.
LIBDY N Dynamic liberalisation effects.
Notes: All variables, unless otherwise stated are reported in real terms.
Financial data for two train operators are reported for calendar years, and had to
be transformed into financial years (by summation and dividing by 2). Wages and sa-
laries reported for train operating companies in their early years of existence partially
included costs for pensions and social security. However, this was not considered to
be a major problem, since in the first few years these costs were negligible. Some
values for PERF and CANCEL were missing, and had to be filled using statistical
interpolation (this concerns solely BRB years). During the period of privatisation
(1994-1997), the introduction of Railtrack and the separation of BR meant that the
47
transferral of assets, staff, or tasks most certainly led to measurement errors in re-
ported figures. Similarly, the train operators did not come into existence at exactly
the same time rendering the pooled financial data less reliable for this period. For
the variable ACCIDENT train incidents caused by broken windscreens had to be
excluded as those figures were only required to be reported after 1995. Eurostar (i.e.
the trains operating in the tunnel between Great Britain and continental Europe)
was excluded from the analysis because it was not part of the franchise scheme, and
because of the special nature of its operations.
(ii) Descriptive Statistics
The time series variation of different output measures (in million kilometres) for pas-
sengers and freight transport can be traced in Figure I. The large rise in passenger
numbers and average journey length from the mid 1990s until 2005 did not mate-
rialise in higher modal shares, which have remained stagnant at six per cent.5 Over
the length of the entire sample, changes in mobility patterns are well reflected, so
that, for example, in 1964 the share of rail in overall passenger transport was eleven
per cent. In light of stagnant modal shares, the increase in passenger kilometres and
train kilometres in the post-British Rail regime may well be attributed to an increase
in total mobility. This increase in mobility was accompanied by an increase in to-
tal investment, including track, renewals, new routes and electrification, signalling,
buildings, plants and equipment, as-well as rolling stock investment.6
5Source: Transport Statistics UK, 2006 edition.
6For investment comparable figures are only available from 1986 onwards.
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Figure I: Output Measures and Investment
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Figure II: Economies of Density
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Figure II attempts to look at economies of density from different perspectives.
In the first row, average costs are plotted against density that is output divided by
network size. Typically, one would expect that average costs decrease as the network
is utilised more fully, exploiting economies of scale. Such a relationship can loosely
be observed, however, there will be a range of other factors influencing average costs.
Figure II also includes a scatter plot with punctuality and density. One could
also argue that should a network get so dense that congestion becomes a major
issue, punctuality will suffer. Again, a clear linear relationship is difficult to see, in
particular, considering the small size of the sample. Interesting to note is the relatively
bad punctuality record between 2001 and 2003. Some of this performance decrease
can be connected to two fatal rail accidents and subsequent speed restrictions applied
to the network.
Table IV summarises some key non-financial indicators during different phases
of British rail history. As outlined in the previous section, the first major post-war
changes to the network took place in the 1980s, so 1982-1992 could be labelled the
contraction phase. The period of 1993 to 1997 can be seen as the restructuring phase,
whereas the last period of the sample can be viewed as the liberalisation regime. It is
clear that the network and number of stations have continuously decreased, except for
the liberalisation period, which records an increase in arithmetic means. A similar
effect can be observed for passenger kilometres. The one variable, which shows a
continuous rise is electrification. Staff numbers similarly are an important figure of
interest, however, because of a lack of detailed staff figures in British Rail records
the early numbers are not comparable with the liberalisation figures. Nevertheless,
staff numbers have continuously decreased between 1964 and 1993. Moreover, it is
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Table IV: Arithmetic Means of Key Non-Financial Indicators
Variable 1964-1982 1982-1992 1993-1997 1998-2005
Staff Numbers 254290.29 137317.43 113533.67 70674.57
Passenger Km 29928.25 31916.04 30698.2 38310
Stations 2678.81 2433.29 2488.5 2504.4
Network Size 15338.72 14320.96 14350.13 14865.89
Station Spacing 0.1746 0.1699 0.1734 0.1685
Electrification 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.35
Network Size is reported in kilometres. Electrification is calculated as route
kilometres electrified over route kilometres open to passenger traffic. Also
note that staff numbers are not strictly comparable
quite impressive that at one time over a quarter of a million people were employed at
British Rail.
A standard correlation matrix for selected variables is presented in Table V. The
competition indicator shows a negative correlation with total costs and infrastructure
costs. Punctuality and total costs are similarly negatively correlated, which might
not be what one would expect, since an increase in operating costs should increase
quality rather than decrease it. On the other hand, one could argue that an increase in
punctuality implies less congestion, which in turn could lower operating expenditure.
Regardless of these arguments, simple correlations or trends cannot take into account
other factors influencing quality and costs. Therefore, the next chapter will attempt
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Table V: Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables
Variables Station
Spacing
Punctuality Electrification
Infrastructure
Costs
Total
Costs
Competition Density
Station Spacing 1.00 0.18 −0.66 0.37 0.02 −0.41 −0.45
Punctuality 0.18 1.00 −0.56 −0.46 −0.66 0.13 −0.78
Electrification −0.66 −0.56 1.00 0.04 0.42 0.27 0.62
Infrastructure Costs 0.37 −0.46 0.04 1.00 0.89 −0.39 0.47
Total Costs 0.02 −0.66 0.42 0.89 1.00 −0.22 0.70
Competition −0.41 0.13 0.27 −0.39 −0.22 1.00 −0.17
Density −0.45 −0.78 0.62 0.47 0.70 −0.17 1.00
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(iii) Methodology
As outlined in Section II of this chapter, a number of variables have to be considered
when estimating railways costs. When looking at the effects of deregulation, there
are additional variables of interest, as cost per unit of output may also be interpreted
as a measure of cost efficiency. In the framework set out in Section II, the most
important factors to be accounted for are scale economies, heterogeneity in quality,
network size, and density. Further, as the sample spans over 40 years, technological
changes should also be considered.
Ideally, one may wish to estimate a translog-cost function using a panel, yet data
are not available in a form suitable for estimating this type of cost function. Therefore,
a more traditional approach seems a viable alternative. For the post-privatisation
regime firm data are pooled to create an artificially integrated operator. Thus, cost
efficiency, measured as average costs, can be modelled for the entire industry over the
40 year period.
Relying on both, previous empirical models and theories on the economy of rail-
roads, the model is estimated as
lnACt = β1DENSt + β2COMPt + β3LIB + β4LIBDY N + βQt + εt, (III.1)
where the dependent variable, ACt, is operating expenditure divided by output.
On the right hand side the base specification comprises a constant, time, COMPt,
DENSt, LIB, and LIBDY N . In addition safety, performance and technology va-
riables are included in Qt. Although the choice of time, t, as a dependent variable
may seem ad-hoc at first, it is quite likely that over a 20 year period one does require
at least a proxy for technological change or innovations of some kind.
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Before estimating equation III.1, time series properties of the main variables and
the explanatory variable are identified using graphical analysis and testing. Figure III
shows the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions for the explanatory
variable ACt. This may suggest, since the ACF declines over a number of lags,
that the series might be non-stationary. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test confirms
that ACt does, indeed, have a unit root. Therefore, the analysis proceeds using the
differenced series only. Figure IV looks at the distribution of the main variables in
comparison to the quantiles of the normal distribution. While some of the sample
quantiles do line up with the theoretical quantiles, this is clearly not the case for all
variables.
Quality, safety, incentive, employment, government support, and performance va-
riables are included in Qt (see Table III for reference). The inclusion of variables
in Qt is based on formulating a general model and then testing down to obtain the
best model. Such an approach is used to at least partially avoid what is referred to
as ’data mining’ in the literature (Lovell 1983), i.e. models are revised from bottom
to top, given evidence already obtained from the data. Especially, the existence of a
database with few observations and a relatively large number of variables implies that
randomly running regressions may lead to controversial (and not replicable) results.
As much as theory is one guide on which decisions about the inclusion of variables,
and the structure of the model can be based, testing down from a general model can
offer additional advantages. This has been demonstrated to great effect in recent
literature (Hendry (2000), Hoover & Perez (1999)).
The limited number of observations means that in the general model there is a
limit on the lag order that may be included. After estimating and testing a model,
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Figure III: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions
progress analysis reports are evaluated and either the general model is rejected or it
is not. The decision on whether to reject the more general model is based on values
for log-likelihood, the AIC, BIC and HQ criteria and ultimately on critical values for
F-tests for reduction of previously specified models.
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Figure IV: QQ-Plots of Main Variables
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The first step, when searching for the specification of the model, is to exclude va-
riables with a very large p-value (typically 0.8 or higher). Then the next most general
model that can feasibly be tested will allow for an autoregressive as well as distribu-
ted lags structure for the remaining variables. If applicable further reductions will be
attempted by reducing the number of parameters. Ideally, the model, thus eventually
selected, additionally meets the requirement of performing well in diagnostic tests
and of being consistent with economic theory.
In addition the paper follows a Bayesian approach to model selection, a technique
often referred to as Bayesian model averaging (BMA)7. One advantage of BMA is
that model uncertainty can be accounted for in the analysis. On the other hand,
certain care is needed because one central assumption of the BMA method is that
one of the models is actually the correct one.
Given a variable of interest, in this particular case, ACt, and the data, D, there
are usually a number of feasible models, M1, ... Mk, which could be used to analyse
ACt. Even if the uncertainty is restricted to the possible explanatory variables, the
number of potential models quickly reaches millions.8
In BMA, based on the law of total probability, the posterior distribution of ACt,
is given by
P(ACt|D) =
K∑
k=1
P(ACt|Mk, D)P(Mk|D), (III.2)
where P(ACt|Mk, D) is the posterior distribution of ACt given the model Mk, and
P(Mk|D) is the posterior probability that Mk is the correct model, given that one of
the models considered is correct. The posterior probability or the weight of a model,
k, can be derived as
7For an excellent exposition of Baysian econometrics see Geweke (2005).
8One famous article drawing attention to this problem is Sala-i-Martin (1997).
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P(Mk|D) =
P(D|Mk)P(Mk)∑K
l=1 P(D|Ml)P(Ml)
. (III.3)
The marginal likelihood of model Mk, P(D|Mk) is then given as
P(D|Mk) =
∫
P(D|θk,Mk)P(θk|Mk)dθk, (III.4)
where θk is the vector of parameters of model Mk. Equation III.2 can also be
used to obtain the posterior mean of a regression parameter, β, comparable to a
point-estimator,
P(β|D) =
∑
β˜kP(Mk|D), (III.5)
where β˜k is the posterior mean of β under model Mk. Similarly, an expression for
the model-averaged standard error can be obtained. It can be shown that BMA offers
advantages, most of all more reliable (and reproducible) results compared to other
selection methods (Raftery, Madigan & Hoeting 1997, Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery &
Volinsky 1999).
Until recently computation of a Baysian model avaraging procedure posed dif-
ficulties, in particular, as it involves the solution of the high-dimensional integral
P(D|Mk). However, Raftery et al. (1997) provide a solution, which is especially use-
ful for linear models. For estimation this paper relies on the statistics software R9
and its package BMA in Version 3.12 (Raftery, Painter & Volinsky 2005).
Another issue to consider in this particular econometric model are structural
breaks. It could be argued that by assumption, the restructuring and privatisation
of British Rail constitute a structural break in the data set. The advantage is that it
9www.r-project.org
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is actually possible to test for this break using testing procedures such as the Chow
test.
IV Results
(i) Discussion
The results from time series estimation and Bayesian estimation are presented in
Table VI. Columns (1) and (2) report results applying the selected model to the full
sample and the quality sub-sample respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report results
for the Baysian model averaging process, as found by the technique described in the
previous section. Columns Pr (3) and Pr(4) show the posterior probability (in per
cent) that the variable is in the model. Figure V graphically shows which variables
have been selected for the 33 models over the entire sample, whereas Figure VI delivers
the same output for the sub-sample where quality data were available.
The results suggest that while liberalisation initially led to higher cost efficiency in
the British rail industry, developments since then have had a negative effect. Analysis
of the first-differenced OLS estimation as presented in columns (1) and (2) suggest
that the variables from the base specification, DENS, LIB, COMP , and LIBDY N
are all statistically significant and of the expected sign. Safety and quality parameters
such as ACCIDENT or FATAL, on the other hand, do not appear to have a
measurable impact.
For economies of density, DENS columns (1) and (2) in Table VI indicate that
an increase in density by 16,000 million passengers kilometers on a given network size
would decrease average costs by around 0.5%. A similar magnitude of cost reduction
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Table VI: Estimation Results for Cost Efficiency
Explanatory
Variable
(1) (2) Pr (3) (3) Pr (4) (4)
DENS −0.0054∗
(-4.62)
−0.0044∗
(-4.14)
89.3 −0.0034∗
(0.002)
94.4 −0.0028∗
(0.001)
LIB −110.00∗
(-2.35)
−124.40∗
(-3.35)
12.4 −5.3920
(24.9)
41.0 −33.093
(52.65)
COMP −0.0049∗
(-2.38)
−0.0053∗
(-3.37)
99.0 −0.0063∗
(0.002)
100.0 −0.0060∗
(0.002)
FATAL −0.0038
(-0.19)
0.0382
(1.35)
5.3 −0.0002
(0.004)
15.7 0.0050
(0.02)
FIRE 0.0002
(0.45)
0.0000
(0.05)
6.7 0.0000
(0.00)
3.9 0.0000
(0.00)
LIBDY N 0.0552∗
(2.35)
0.0624∗
(3.35)
14.3 0.0027
(0.01)
41.8 0.0166
(0.03)
ELECTRIC 1.1237
(0.89)
5.4 0.0133
(0.39)
6.3 0.0467
(0.48)
PUNCTUAL 0.6588
(1.79)
32.5 0.1715
(0.33)
CANCEL 5.3 −0.0043
(0.39)
ENERGY 0.1464∗
(2.44)
56.9 0.7828∗
(0.087)
100.0 0.1860∗
(0.065)
ACCIDENT 9.3 0.0000
(0.00)
4.0 0.0000
(0.00)
LOAD 32.4 −0.0018
(0.003)
17.2 −0.0005
(0.002)
SPACING 5.3 −0.0010
(0.02)
22.9 0.0450
(0.11)
R¯2 0.38643 0.6349
Observations 42 32 42 32
Asterisk denotes statistical significance at common levels of
significance. For columns (1) and (2) the values of the t-statistic are
reported in parenthesis. For columns (3) and (4) rounded BMA
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. R¯2 is the adjusted R2.
The dependent variable in all models is the first differenced natural
logarithm of cost per unit of output.
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Figure V: BMA Model Selection over Entire Sample
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Figure VI: BMA Model Selection over Quality Sub-Sample
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can be achieved by increasing the number of effective competitors, as measured by
COMP . ENERGY was only retained in the quality sub-sample as outlined in the
discussion of methodology described in the previous section. It would suggest that in
this sub-sample a one gramm/passenger kilometre reduction of petroleum dependence
led to a 14% decrease in average costs. While this effect is large it should be noted
that ENERGY very likely proxies for a variety of technological changes which have
occurred over the 40-year period.
In the quality sub-sample, the percentage of trains arriving within 10 minutes of
schedule, i.e. PUNCTUAL, is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. This
would suggest that increases in punctuality are indeed costly to the system. The
regression also shows a much higher adjusted R2, however, this should be taken as a
sign of the small number of observations rather than the increased fit of the model.
It is, however, reassuring that the statistically significant explanatory variables in (1)
do not change considerably in magnitude when restricting the sample size as in (2).
The posterior means and standard errors from BMA can be found in columns
(3) and (4) of Table VI. First of all it is interesting to note that DENS, COMP ,
and ENERGY have very high posterior probabilities of being in the model. This
can be inferred from columns Pr (3) and Pr(4), as-well as Figures V and VI. For
the quality sub-sample BMA selects COMP for every possible model. The resulting
posterior mean suggests that an 0.6% cost reduction can be achieved by increasing
the number of effective competitors, COMP by one unit. Although the posterior
mean of DENS is smaller than the point estimate provided in (1) and (2) economies
of density is statistically significant and of the expected sign.
BMA also delivers results with concern to the liberalisation indicators, LIB and
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LIBDY N . Even though the sign of the coefficients remains the same, the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients decreases while the posterior standard error is high.
Figures V and VI evidently show that LIB and LIBDY N were only included in a
limited number of models. The weights in the BMA will, thus, result in low posterior
means and high posterior standard errors.
In the quality sub-sample (from 1973 onwards) BMA posterior probabilities for
quality indicators PUNCTUAL and CANCEL are 32.5% and 5.3% respectively.
Although the coefficient on PUNCTUAL is positive, level the null hypothesis of the
coefficient being zero cannot be rejected. All safety indicators such as fatality rate,
FATAL, accident rate, ACCIDENT , or the number of fires on trains, FIRE, are
similarly not statistically significant. It is also interesting to note that ENERGY
and COMP were selected in all models.
The variables, ACCIDENT , LOAD, and SPACING, which were dropped from
OLS estimation in the procedure outlined in the previous section, also show low selec-
tion probabilities and high standard errors in BMA. One notable difference between
OLS and BMA results is that for the “best” models, BMA selected no more than
5 parameters, suggesting that there is a high payoff from overparameterisation. Se-
condly, the fact that LIB and LIBDY N were statistically significant in the OLS
regression, but not in the BMA procedure, may be related to some natural tendency
of the researcher to focus on variables of great interest. On the other hand, the coef-
ficients on both parameters are of similar magnitude in the individual BMA models,
but are eventually averaged out. Considering some short-comings of BMA modelling,
one may not choose to discard the results of traditional OLS estimation.
To obtain an even better idea of the development of the British rail industry,
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one may want to link these results from econometric estimation to some key figures
not in the procedure. One could argue that although initially reforms successfully
increased cost efficiency, the liberalised regime deteriorated from 1997 onwards. Most
of the quality indicators do not seem to have an impact on average costs. Therefore,
naturally, some questions remain with regard to the cause of deterioration of cost
efficiency. It has often been suggested that over-regulation and speed restrictions
after fatal accidents at Ladbroke Grove (1999), Hatfield (2000), and Potter’s Bar
(2002) led to high costs and a decrease in efficiency. Seeing as neither a change
in punctuality, nor accident, or fatality rates have an effect on cost efficiency, this
argument is difficult to support in light of the previous analysis.
On the one hand, one could argue that causality cannot be easily established in
econometric analysis. Keeping this in mind, however, one may, nevertheless, look
further. Data on train age were collected from 1985 onwards (and thus could not be
included in the analysis without dramatically decreasing the number of observations),
shows that while average train age remained roughly constant at around 20-22 years,
it decreased rapidly to 15 years in the last few years of the sample. This dramatic
change in quality could at least partially account for the deterioration of cost efficiency
as it represents a shift in quality.
Secondly, vertical economies or transactions costs may have had an economically
significant impact of efficiency because divestiture may, for example increase the cost
of making a coordinated timetable. Again, this is difficult to establish in an econome-
tric model, yet one could draw attention to one interesting variable in this context,
PAY DIR or director’s remuneration, as described in Table III. Again, while the sala-
ries of directors and board members of the monopolist British Rail remained roughly
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the same (in real terms) from 1964 onwards, restructuring into many different com-
panies implied on average a 10-fold increase in executive pay. While this is at best
viewed as circumstantial evidence, it highlights the fact that divestiture does intro-
duce new costs to an industry. As such, it is crucial that other simultaneous reforms
such as deregulation or the introduction of competition, which as the analysis shows
can improve cost efficiency, are carried out.
Scope for discussion is delivered by the long-time downward trend in unit costs
prior to privatisation, which could be also interpreted as ongoing restructuring mea-
sures. Empirical studies (see Megginson & Netter (2001) for an overview) have shown
that efficiency gains for (formerly) publicly owned enterprises can be observed in the
run up to privatisation as-well as afterwards. Indeed, it is not the case that the Bri-
tish Railways Boards was surprised in 1994, realizing that they were, unexpectedly,
about to be turned into 105 privately owned companies. On the other hand, the rail-
road industry was one of the last big industries in Great Britain to be privatised and
liberalised, a move that was not yet openly discussed in 1984. Moreover, there was a
positive signal when, contrary to expectations prevailing at the time, the electrifica-
tion of the East Coast Mainline was carried out under the government of Margaret
Thatcher. Debates about the restructuring of BR only started around 1989 and al-
though a decision came about in late 1992, most questions about the exact industry
structure were still unanswered. Therefore, it is likely that the downward trend also
captures another effect like technological change rather than simply highlighting the
effect of prior restructuring measures.
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Table VII: Selected Diagnostic Test
Test-statistic (1) (2)
Durbin-Watson 0.9167 0.5198
Shapiro-Wilk 0.1627 0.7258
Goldfeldt-Quandt 0.8167 0.4595
Harrison-McCabe 0.7770 0.3660
Box-Ljung 0.4159 0.1069
Reported values are p-values.
(ii) Model Diagnostics
Figure VII reports the results of the diagnostic tests on the econometric model and re-
siduals. Goldfeldt-Quant and Harrison-McCabe are testing procedures to determine
heteroscedasticity, Shapiro-Wilk tests independence, while the Durbin-Watson test
statistic looks at autocorrelation, and Box-Ljung at the normality of residuals. The
null hypotheses are no autocorrelation, homoscedasticity, independence, and norma-
lity respectively. As the reported p-values confirm, the residuals are normally dis-
tributed and well behaved. Moreover, the assumptions of constant variance and no
autocorrelation are not violated. All diagnostic tests are performed on the full, (1),
and the sub-sample, (2).
With a model as presented above, one concern is related to structural change. In a
linear model with a single break point, tbr in a sample t = 1, . . . T , this amounts to
testing the null hypothesis of structural stability, versus the alternative,
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Figure VII: F-test for Structural Stability over Time
βi = βA (0 < t < tbr) (IV.1)
= βB (t > tbr). (IV.2)
The Chow test proceeds to fit regressions on the two sub-samples separated by
the break point and rejects the null hypothesis of structural stability, if
F =
RSS − ESS
ESS(t− 2k)
, (IV.3)
is above the critical value (Chow 1960). RSS denotes the restricted sum of squares
from the break-point sub-sample, whereas ESS denotes the sum of squares from
the entire sample. Rather than relying on having to guess a particular break point,
computing routines make it possible to calculate this F-statistic over the entire sample.
Resulting F-values are plotted in Figure VII, with the red line representing the critical
values at the 5% level of significance. As is evident from the graph, the hypothesis of
structural stability cannot be rejected for any possible break point.
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V Conclusion
Setting out from a general premise of railway economics this chapter analyses British
railway data over a 40 year period. In particular, the chapter tries to investigate
whether the divestiture and privatisation of the former state monopolist British Rail
led to performance improvements. The British example is of special interest since it
is the only European country to implement reforms in such an extensive form.
Statistical and econometric analysis highlights the importance of scale economies,
in particular, economies of density. Furthermore, while liberalisation initially led to
improvements in cost efficiency, results suggest that performance deteriorated over
time. The analysis shows that reductions in average costs can also be achieved by
increasing competition or decreasing oil dependency.
It should be noted that a generalisation of these results is difficult. The practical
implementation of the post-privatisation structure has often been described as being
far from optimal. Yet, the analysis of liberalisation effects in this paper is based on
observations from an actual separation experience not an efficient one. Therefore, a
dummy variable will act as a fairly crude proxy for and will pick up many different
effects. On the other hand, the magnitude of LIB and LIBDY N suggests that
restructuring and privatisation did matter in this particular case.
Apart from financial performance, quality is often a key variable of interest af-
ter liberalisation. For railways quality can, for example, be measured in terms of
punctuality, station spacing, or train age. While the punctuality record of the dif-
ferent train operators is indeed mixed, train age has decreased significantly since
privatisation. Of course, the remaining uncertainty is, whether 15-year-old trains of-
fer advantages over older trains. In addition, simultaneous to privatisation efforts,
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significant expansion has taken place as measured in network size, the number of sta-
tions, and passenger kilometres. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation between
density and punctuality, suggesting that the increase in passengers hampered quality
improvements.
Further, it should be noted that industry-wide risk-aversion after the high-profile
accidents at Potter’s Bar, Hatfield, and Ladbroke Grove have led to a quite drama-
tic increase in costs (especially for the infrastructure manager). Thus, it could be
concluded, that even though vertical economies do matter, it is possible that careful
industry design in combination with the stimulation of competition imply higher cost
efficiency for a vertically separated railway industry rather than an integrated mono-
polist. Competition, as this paper shows, could be the essential tool in this context.
Consequently, a careful reconsideration of the franchising process and the number of
franchises should be a priority on the policy agenda. Especially the ongoing reduction
of the number of franchises seems questionable in the light of this study.
A further general policy direction, suggested by the results, is the serious consi-
deration of the option of local integrated monopolies that compete through franchise
bidding may be a suitable alternative to a separate infrastructure manager. Noting
the structure of the rail industry in Great Britain today, one cannot deny that consi-
derable concentration is already in place. Most of the franchises are owned by three
major players, who in turn mostly operate in related transport industries (bus ope-
rators, sea freight). It would be unrealistic to expect that a bus and rail operator
owned (or “franchised”) by the same parent company will compete with itself any
more than British Rail fostered yardstick competition between its Intercity and Re-
gional segments. One should keep in mind in this context that externalities arising
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from road congestion, noise, and environmental pollution are of such magnitude that
they should not simply be used to justify subsidies for railways, but more importantly
a well-designed regulatory structure and thought-through franchising mechanism.
Chapter 3
Reforming Utilities: The Empirics
of Performance, Ownership and
Liberalisation
In this chapter I analyse the impact of market reform in a sample of over 2000 state-
owned and privately owned utilities around the world between 1996 and 2006. Using
OECD data, the paper differentiates between ownership effects and liberalisation
effects. A range of performance measures are used to establish that market reform
and private ownership do have a statistically and economically significant impact
on firm performance and profitability. The chapter establishes the need of further
research to look at particular reforms and merges empirical results with theoretical
models.
I Introduction
Whereas privatisation and ownership studies (Megginson et al. 1994, Dewenter &
Malatesta 1997, D’Souza & Megginson 1999, Dewenter & Malatesta 2001, Megginson
et al. 2004, D’Souza et al. 2007) document efficiency improvements, the reasons for
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achieving these improvements have not yet been firmly established in empirical work.
In particular, there is some concern that these large scale studies do not sufficiently
disentangle pure ownership effects from other factors, such as competition and market
reform. For utilities and infrastructure, these other possible determinants of firm per-
formance may be especially pronounced, considering many countries’ drives towards
deregulation and liberalisation.
The privatisation of utilities typically does not only involve the transfer of owner-
ship shares but in many cases far-reaching market reforms. In the case of telecommu-
nications, electric utilities, postal services, water, and transport, ownership changes
are accompanied by deregulation, restructuring, divestiture and liberalisation. Typi-
cally traditional privatisation studies do not account for these different factors (for a
survey see, for example, Megginson & Netter (2001)). When looking at efficiency it
is, however, important to distinguish the impact of deregulation or changes in compe-
titive forces from ownership effects. Otherwise, if we postulate that deregulation or
competition have a positive influence on performance, the effect of ownership changes
is likely to be overestimated.
While industry or country studies are much better able to, and in general do,
account for market reform and liberalisation, such approaches have the drawback of
being confined to one particular place or industry and as such offer less scope for gene-
ralisation. Therefore, the research in this chapter sets out to model firm performance
on ownership and liberalisation across infrastructure sectors and across countries. To
do so the OECDs regulation indicators are combined with financial firm level data.
Apart from the most general question of whether regulatory reform “worked” the
paper also tries to distinguish between different performance measures. It is, for
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example, likely that market reform led to a decrease in profitability, while improving
investment performance, and private ownership fostered increases in profitability.
Two central issues in the corporate governance literature are the identity of owners
and the concentration of ownership (see, for example, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) or
Mueller (2003) for excellent overviews). Chapter 1 points out that the governance
mechanism, when the (major) shareholder of a firm is the government, is very different
from other ownership structures. With state ownership, the providers of finance, i.e.
the taxpayers, have no direct control over the managers of the firm, nor do they
receive any direct repatriation of profits. In turn, it could of course be argued, that
the need for taxpayer financing is related to the profitability and efficiency of the
firm. Some infrastructure industries, such as railways in Europe, require subsidies (as
a percentage of GDP, quite sizeable subsidies) to break even, let alone make profits.
On the other hand, state shareholdings tend to be relatively large, therefore, reducing
potential agency costs by being able to control managers (better).
While governments may pursue concentrated shareholdings to put pressure on ma-
nagers, thereby reducing the agency problem between managers and the government-
owner, the agency problems between politicians and taxpayers persist. In this sense,
contrary to theories on ownership concentration, large government shareholdings may
increase agency costs because of increased political pressure on the firm. Similarly,
unlike other large institutional shareholders, like banks, governments do not necessa-
rily follow the goal of maximising the returns on investment.
Yet ownership structure is not the only factor influencing performance, recent
evidence on investment performance suggests that institutions and legal systems out-
weigh the effects of ownership structure (Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu 2004). With
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regard to state ownership, the results presented by Gugler et al. (2004) are somewhat
conflicting, with state owned (i.e. with state shareholdings of 10 per cent or more)
enterprises performing well in all country groups except for the European-Germanic
legal system countries. In French-origin and Asian-German origin countries state
owned companies even outperform other ownership types.
Studies on corporate governance and performance attempt to allow for regulation
and/or competition in some form. To account for competition D’Souza et al. (2007)
use a dummy variable for regulated utilities (telecom, electric, gas, water) which
is problematic, as, for example, mobile operations in telecommunications in many
countries are no longer regulated, and, moreover, competition is present in at least
some of these industries (via competitive bidding or otherwise). The OECD indicator
variables account for direct or indirect competition, for example, instances where
concessions are awarded, based on some form of bidding process.
In an industry-study Ros (1999) on telecommuncations between 1986 and 1995,
private ownership is associated with network expansion, whereas competition has
a positive effect on efficiency (main lines per employee). Researching a sample of
Spanish firms, Villalonga (2000) finds no significant efficiency effect, with privatisation
leading both to increases and decreases in efficiency (in about as many cases). When
adjusting the model to include political and organizational variables, these factors
turn out to have a significant impact on post-privatisation performance.
There is evidence that ownership is largely responsible for post-privatisation per-
formance improvement. D’Souza et al. (2007) find that there is a positive relationship
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between profitability and state ownership, whereas regulation is statistically insigni-
ficant when regressed on changes in returns on sales. Privatisation studies often dif-
ferentiate between utilities and non-infrastructure industries, despite that fact that
these often make up a considerable proportion of the entire sample. In N. Boubarki
& Guedhami (2005) infrastructure accounts for almost half the sample. A survey of
the literature on infrastructure privatisation can be found in Chapter 1.
Section II of this chapter introduces the data set including descriptive statistics.
The next part continues with an outline of the econometric considerations and metho-
dology, followed by the presentation of the main results in part IV. Section V offers
some conclusions.
II The Data
The data were mainly collected relying on three sources: the 1998 to 2006 versions
of AMADEUS, Reuters Xtra 3000 and the OECD. Industries were selected on the
basis of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 2002. Codes
included in the analysis are Utilities (22) including Electric Power, Transmission
and Distribution (2211), Natural Gas Distribution (2212), Postal Services (4911),
Air Transportation (481), Rail Transportation (482), and Telecommunications (517).
Observations with missing financial or employment data were excluded, leaving a
total of 2204 firms in the unbalanced panel data sample. The number of firms for
each country and sector are given in Table I and Table II.
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Table I: Distribution of Firms across Countries
Country Number of Firms Country Number of Firms
Austria 20 Belgium 78
Czech Republic 62 Denmark 83
Finland 59 France 153
Germany 224 Greece 27
Ireland 22 Italy 203
Netherlands 152 Norway 163
Poland 82 Portugal 11
Spain 233 Sweden 80
Switzerland 63 United Kingdom 489
Table II: Distribution of Firms across Industries
Industry Number of Firms
Electricity (2211) 820
Natural Gas (2212) 162
Airlines (4810, 4811, 4812) 159
Rail (4820, 4821) 190
Post (4910, 4911) 53
Telecom (5151, 5179) 729
Note: NAICS Code in Parenthesis
78
The majority of firms are located in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and
Italy. The relative (to population) over-representation of UK based firms with a quar-
ter of the sample, could be explained by the deregulation and liberalisation measures
taken in the UK. Figure I of the aggregated regulatory OECD indicators between 1990
and 2007 shows that the UK is at the bottom end of the scale. In particular, at the
beginning of the firm sample period the UK’s aggregate indicator is equal to 1.8 out of
6 and thereby lower than some countries’ indicators at the end of the sample period.
This documents that regulatory reform in the UK was already well-progressed when
most other countries only started their deregulation process. Therefore, the number
of firms in the British infrastructure industries may be relatively large, considering
that deregulation is often accompanied by vertical and horizontal divestiture of the
former state monopolists. In particular, the deregulation of rail, airlines, natural gas
and telecommunications created a large number of firms in sectors formerly served
by British Rail, British Airways, British Gas and British Telecom.
Similarly, Table II confirms that the number of firms is distributed unevenly across
sectors. The electricity and telecommunications sectors are represented heavily in the
sample, suggesting that reform has been particularly prominent in those industries.
On the other hand, these differences may also be related to technological aspects
and historical developments. In electricity, distribution networks and generation were
historically organised more locally, whereas airlines and postal services were organised
on a national level.
Competition and regulatory indicators for OECD countries are estimated in Conway
& Nicoletti (2006) and were revised in 20081. For each of the sectors and for each
1http://www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.
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Figure I:Aggregate OECD Indicators of Regulatory Reform in Sampled
Countries, 1990-2007.
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Figure II: Liberalisation Indicators in Selected Countries, 1996-2007.
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country these indicators are a weighted index of regulatory reform, taking into ac-
count entry regulation, the degree of vertical integration and market structure. For
the purpose of this study, the updated 2008 version is the basis for the competition
and ownership variables. The ownership variable is taken directly from the OECD
indicators, whereas the liberalisation variable is an average of various competition and
regulation indicators. The data span from 1996 to 2006 for Airlines, Rail Transport,
Electricity, Natural Gas and Telecommunications and where, thus, matched with the
NAICS codes from the firm data panel. A higher indicator always implies a lower
degree of liberalisation.
The OECD data are graphically depicted in Figure ?? and Figure II. Deregula-
tion and liberalisation efforts appear to have been considerable, and are particularly
pronounced in the period under investigation. In principle, the indicators have been
published for the years 1975 onwards but a downward trend for the majority of coun-
tries is only apparant from 1990 on. As pointed out above, the United Kingdom
forms an exception, with reforms starting earlier than in other countries. However,
it is also clear that the aggregated data conceal that the development has not been
uniform across industries. Figure II traces the evolution of regulatory reform in se-
lected countries. Railways, and in some cases postal services, have been subjected to
deregulation and liberalisation measures to a lesser degree than, for example, elec-
tricity and telecommuncations. The difference across countries is quite considerable,
showing that reform has not been applied consistently.
Financial data, taken from the 2006 version of AMADEUS, include the Return
on Assets (ROA), the number of Sales, Profits, the number of Employees, Operating
profits, revenues and net incomes between 1996 and 2006. Summary statistics are
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Table III: Summary Statistics for OECD Indicators
Statistic Liberalisation Ownership
Minimum 0.000 0.00
1st Quantile 0.800 0.00
Median 1.600 2.60
Mean 1.958 2.54
3rd Quantile 2.600 4.50
Maximum 6.000 6.00
Correlation 0.4194
Note: Maxima equal a high degree of state involvement.
given in Table IV. The sampled firms vary widely in size and profitability. Whereas
eleven firms have employment figures above 100, 000, over 1, 800 firms have less than
1, 000 employees. In 2006, eight firms made negative profits, whereas the mean in the
same year was given by USD 68, 840, making it on average more “profitable” than in
preceding years.
83
Table IV: Summary Statistics for Financial Variables
Statistic Employee ROA OpProfit Sales Profit Revenue NetIncome
Minimum 1 -100.00 -20764000 0 -2.679e+07 0 -31276640
1st Quantile 37 -0.110 -4 13201 -5.875e+01 14716 -25
Median 130 3.850 1747 38134 1.394e+03 42753 734
Mean 2125 3.125 38686 498595 2.817e+04 555146 7064
3rd Quantile 442 9.235 8932 138730 8.166e+03 168759 5103
Maximum 388859 96.790 36840082 185754205 3.375e+07 195054551 19405717
Note: These summary statistics refer to the entire sample. For estimation extreme observations were excluded.
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In addition to our key variables of interest, that is financial performance, ownership
and competition, a number of additional variables form part of the data set. A dummy
variable indicates whether a company is publicly listed. Out of all sampled utilities
458 are quoted on a stockmarket, the majority have alternative corporate governance
mechanisms. To account for business cycle effects, aggregated income data are added
to the data set. For income data, the source was again the OECD, with Gross
Domestic product in USD, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference year 2000 (in
millions).
III Econometric Considerations
In the literature two principal methodologies have been adopted when analysing pri-
vatisation. Following Megginson et al. (1994) empirical studies have compared pre-
and post-privatisation means or medians using statistical analysis. Another strand
of the empirical literature has relied on econometric estimation, working under the
premise that privatisation can be viewed as an intervention. This paper builds on the
latter approach, while adopting it to the requirments set out in the previous sections.
In empirical work on privatisation aspects of firm performance include profitablilty,
efficiency and output. Porta & de Silanes (1999), for example, measure profitability as
the ratios operating income to sales, net income to sales, whereas operating efficiency
is measured as cost per unit or the sales to employee ratio. Return on assets (ROA)
has also been interpreted as an efficiency measure (Villalonga 2000). Additional
common measures (Megginson & Netter 2001) of firm performance include sales per
employee and the net income to sales ratio.
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Finding adequate measures of the variables of interest, i.e. privatisation, regula-
tion, and competition, is not straightforward. For privatisation, one would ideally
build on actual ownership data (Gugler et al. 2004) and maybe even distinguish bet-
ween different types of ownership, such as insider ownership. While this is feasible
in small scale studies (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer & Tsukanova 1996), the quality of
ownership data for large samples is more difficult to assess and often privatisation
dummies are utilised. In particular, state ownership in many cases does not involve
direct (share)holdings but exists indirectly, through holding companies. Large scale
data sets with this level of information are inherently difficult to obtain and maintain.
Similarly, with regard to regulation, one may wish to distinguish between different
types of regulatory regimes or the intensity of competition. But even in industry stu-
dies, a lack of available data makes results on particular reforms less reliable (Asmild
et al. 2009). Moreover, differences in regulation in a fairly homogeneous region, such
as Europe, are difficult to assess with commonly used indicators distinguishing only
between incentive regulation and rate of return regulation.
Therefore, estimation in this chapter with regard to ownership and liberalisation
relies, as described in the previous section, on the regulation data set provided by
Conway & Nicoletti (2006). Although the use of indices exhibits its own problems,
they should offer additional information to ownership dummy variables. Similarly,
while a liberalisation index is not as specific as data on regulatory institutions or
concentration ratios, the use of panel data in this chapter should allow for an assess-
ment of the impact of market reform over time and across countries and sectors.
Additional controls include a measure of firm size and a dummy for industry
effects. Firm size, on the other hand, is proxied by employment levels. Similarly, a
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dummy variable for quoted companies is included in all estimated models, as-well as
GDP per capita, to implicitly allow for changes in the economic environment of a
given country that may have an impact on firm performance.
One of the major advantages of an econometric approach is, that it aims to cap-
ture firm-specific time invariant effects. This is crucial as it is very likely that firm
performance depends not only on measurable factors, but also unobservable effects
such as management skills. Secondly, the time series properties of the sampled data
are taken into account when analysing the observations.
The baseline approach adopted in this chapter is to estimate the following model:
Yit = Xitβ +Dcjγcj + Zcitδci + ηi + ǫit, (III.1)
where Yit measures performance (costs, return, employment) of firm i at time t,
Xjct is the set of variables of interest (ownership, competition, regulation) in sector
j, in country c in each time period t, Djc are sector and country dummies to account
for sector-specific and country-specific effects and a set of additional controls, Zit.
Further the error is composed of firm-specific unobserved effects, ηi, and transient
errors, ǫit, where the usual assumptions
E[ηi] = 0, E[ǫit] = 0, ; E[ǫitηi] = 0, E[ǫitǫis] = 0 (III.2)
apply.
If the individual effects, ηi, are correlated with the explanatory variables, then
applying the OLS estimator to III.1 is inconsistent. To obtain consistent estimates,
equation III.1 is transformed to remove ηi, and then apply the OLS estimator. In
econometrics this is usually referred to as fixed effects model. If, on the other hand,
the time-invariant effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors, then the OLS
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estimator will be consistent but inefficient so that GLS procedures are preferable
(see discussion in standard textbooks such as Wooldridge (2002)). The important
difference between both approaches is the correlation of ηi, so that fixed effects can
be seen as the more general model, as it imposes fewer assumptions.
To determine which assumption is correct, or whether the fixed or random effects
model should be preferred one can rely on the Hausman test (Hausman 1978). It
compares the estimates coefficients, weighted by the variance-covariance matrix of
the fixed effects (βF ) and random effects (βR), that is
H = (βF − βR)(V ar[βF ]− V ar[βR])
−1(βF − βR). (III.3)
Under the null hypothesis both models are consistent, whereas under the alterna-
tive hypothesis only the fixed effects estimator is consistent. If the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected, then the random effects estimator is efficient, whereas the fixed
effects estimator is not, and the former should be selected.
Alternatively, we can estimate a model which includes lagged terms such as
Yit = Yit−1α +Xitβ +Dcjγcj + Zcitδci + ηi + ǫit. (III.4)
However, in a dynamic panel data model such as III.4 the within-groups estimator
will be biased downwards (Nickell 1981), so it may be an alternative to adopt the
first-differenced GMM approach, first proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991), as-well
as the extended system GMM approach (Blundell & Bond 1998). Therefore, it might
be useful to also look at GMM results as a reference. As in Chapter 2, estimation
is carried out with the statistics software R2, using the plm package by Millo & Y
(2008), which allows for an unbalanced panel.
2http://www.r-project.org
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IV The Main Results
First I present the results from the non-dynamic specification and then from the
dynamic specification of the above model.
(i) Non-dynamic Estimation
Tables V and VI present results for return on assets (ROA) and sales per employee
as the explained variable. Dummy variable estimates are not reported for the sake of
brevity. In the random effects models the competition and ownership indicators are
statistically significant, whereas in the fixed effects model the estimates are statisti-
cally insignificant in the ROA equation.
More interesting of course are the sign and magnitude of the effects. Return on as-
sets, as an albeit imperfect measure of investment efficiency, is the dependent variable
in Table V. It should be recalled that the competition and ownership indicators are
such that a high value indicates a large degree of state ownership and less competition
respectively, whereas low values indicate a liberalised, privatised sector.
The estimated coefficient for competition is negative in both, fixed effects and
random effects models. This would indicate that firms in sectors with a higher degree
of competition and regulatory reform exhibit a higher ROA ratio. It appears that
deregulation measures improve the efficiency of investments made by managers of
utilities, so that more net income is generated from total assets. From the random
effects model, where the estimate is statistically significant, we can calculate that a
one point change in the competition indicator increases ROA by four per cent. Thus,
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if we assume that a sector in a particular country started out as a regulated, non-
competitive industry, then liberalisation efforts would lead to considerable increases
in average firm investment performance.
Private ownership, on the other hand, seems to lower return on assets for firms
in the sample. With an estimated coefficient between 0.3 and 0.4 the magnitude of
the effect is similar to that of the competition indicator. However, one has to be
careful when interpreting the coefficient, in particular in connection with ROA as a
dependent variable. One of the drawbacks when using ROA as a measure of firm
performance is, that it is a very imperfect measure of efficiency in the sense that it
does not show whether firms are able to generate income from a relatively low asset
base. In particular, in relation to state owned enterprises it is generally assumed that
their budget constraint is soft. So, even if, for example, those companies manage to
generate high net income from a very high asset base, it does not mean that the same
income could not have been generated from a lower asset base. With soft budget
constraints as a result of a high degree of state ownership, it may be the case that
large investments were made generating income resulting in a high ROA but not that
capital was necessarily applied in the most efficient way.
Results for sales per employee as the dependent variable are presented in Table
VI. In both fixed effects and random effects modelling, the estimated coefficients for
competition and ownership effects are statistically insignificant. Again, individual
effects and dummy coefficients, which were included in the models, are ommitted
from the report to focus on the main variables of interest.
While results of this model might be termed statistically inconclusive, it is striking
is that competition is positive in sign and that in both models the effect of ownership
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Table V: Random and Fixed effects Model for Return on Assets
Coefficients Estimate t-value Pr(> |t|)
Random effects
Intercept -5.934956 -1.252235 0.2105
ln Employee -0.260473 -2.061441 0.0393
Quoted 1.137145 0.728883 0.4661
Liberalisation -0.414471 -3.286379 0.0010
Ownership 0.419327 3.070632 0.0021
ln GDP 0.674545 1.999951 0.0455
Fixed effects
ln Employee -1.177755 -4.747359 0.0000
Liberalisation -0.178640 -1.696476 0.0898
Ownership 0.304809 1.215195 0.2243
ln GDP 10.52993 3.023416 0.0025
Notes: Unbalanced panel with T = 1− 10 and N = 1996.
The number of observations totals 11029.
P-value for Hausman Test is 0.0000.
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is smaller in magnitude, although the estimate of ownership in the fixed effects model
is very different when compared to the random effects model. This would imply that
sales per employee actually decreases with progressing liberalisation. Considering
that this measure is widely used in the privatisation literature the results do appear
surprising. The political economy literature, for example, often argues that state
ownership may lead to excess employment to attract voters. If this is the case, then
we should expect that sales per employee would increase if privatisation measures
were taken.
On a second look, these results would turn out to be less contradictory. When
competitive measures are introduced into an industry and more firms enter, then
clearly given market demand sales per firm must decrease. If this fall in sales is not
compensated by equally drastic changes in employment, then the Sales per Employee
ratio will as a consequence decrease. Many of the former monopolists in the sample
have seen their sales and market shares drop as a consequence of deregulation and
liberalisation measures.
Indeed, when analysing this issue with regard to perfect competition, we may
even expect that as sectors get more competitive the monopoly mark-up they are
able to charge will fall, and as such firm performance, and in particular profitability,
will deteriorate. A prime example for this effect could be the airline industry where
industry-wide profits have fallen after the introduction of competition (Morrison &
Winston 1995). As such, decreases in profitability in infrastructure industries may
even be interpreted as a successful reform.
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Table VI: Random and Fixed effects Model for Sales per Employee
Coefficients Estimate t-value Pr(> |t|)
Random effects
Intercept 6.007186 10.06082 0.0000
ln GDP 0.017020 0.402306 0.6875
Quoted 0.024447 0.119311 0.9050
Ownership -0.024712 -1.202382 0.2293
Liberalisation -0.217437 -10.54458 0.0000
Fixed effects
Intercept 1.339442 0.158017 0.8744
ln GDP 0.327405 0.520699 0.6026
Ownership -0.027440 -1.324375 0.1854
Liberalisation 0.029845 1.569270 0.1166
Notes: Unbalanced panel with T = 1− 10 and N = 1365.
The number of observations totals 7623.
P-value for Hausman Test is 0.0000.
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(ii) Dynamic Estimation
Fixed and random effects estimation results are reported in Table VII. They highlight
the autoregressive structure of the dependent variable. Generally, the Hausman test
suggests that only the fixed effects estimator is consistent, nevertheless both models
are reported for comparison’s sake.
The ownership and liberalisation indicators in the fixed effects model are both
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The Hausmann test-statistic would
suggest that the fixed effects estimator is consistent for the dynamic ROA model.
The sign of the coefficients is the same as in the non-dynamic model.
The results suggest that reforms, such as vertical divestiture or the removal of
entry barriers, which decrease the liberalisation indicator by one point, led to an
increase in ROA of around 0.2. This can be compared to the sample mean of 3.125.
Table VIII delivers the results for Sales per Employee as specified by equation III.4
earlier. Estimates show that lagged values of the independent variable are highly sta-
tistically and economically significant, with a coefficient of around 0.5. The coefficient
of Quoted is only significant at the 10 per cent level and positive. Again the Hausman
test sugessts that only the fixed effects estimator is consistent.
As compared to earlier non-dynamic modelling, lnGDP is no longer statistically
significant. Most interesting, both the liberalisation indicator and the ownership
indicator are now both highly statistically significant. When compared to the results
of estimating ROA, one can observe that the sign of the coefficients is reversed.
The liberalisation indicator has a positive coefficient of around 0.07. This would
suggest that, after taking into account time and individual effects, as-well as time
series properties, more liberalisation, as measured by this indicator, would decrease
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sales per employee by seven per cent. Recall, that the reform indicator carries a maxi-
mum value of 6, which corresponds to industries with complete vertical integration
or significant market entry barriers.
The results for sales per employee, as a measure of output efficiency, are also
reported in Table VIII. In this case the second lag of the explanatory variable is sta-
tistically significant at the 5 per cent level while the first lag is not. Again as opposed
to the non-dynamic FE and RE estimates, GDP is not statistically significant.
The coefficient on ownership is also statistically significant and negative, with a
value of −0.04. This would suggest that a fall in the ownership indicator, i.e. less state
involvement, would increase sales per employee by 3.6 per cent. One possible inter-
pretation could be that privately owned firms are, indeed, more efficient, generating
higher sales with comparatively fewer employees.
Overall the dynamic models deliver interesting results with respect to ROA and
sales per employee. Whereas private ownership appears to have a negative impact
on investment performance, is has a negative impact on sales per employee. For the
liberalisation indicator results are reversed. For this sample of utlities liberalisation
and competition improve ROA but decrease sales per employee.3
(iii) Diagnostic Checking and Robustness
Panel data models should be subjected to some scrutiny with regard to poolability,
correlation between individual or time effects and the regressors. Moreover, time
series properties, first and foremost serial correlation, need to considered. In all
3The same estimations were carried out for other financial indicators such as profit per employee,
and return on sales. Also GMM estimators were applied. This did not lead to a qualitative change
in results.
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Table VII: Dynamic Model for Return on Assets
Coefficients Estimate t-value Pr(> |t|)
Random effects
Intercept 1.128961 0.476567 0.6337
ROAt−1 0.527804 18.30865 0.0000
ln Employee -0.816472 -1.716597 0.0861
ln Employeet−1 0.623347 1.278939 0.2010
ln GDP -0.620937 -0.063259 0.9496
ln GDPt−1 0.753137 0.076919 0.9387
Ownership 0.131792 2.479771 0.0132
Liberalisation -0.096188 -1.161158 0.2456
Quoted -0.532734 -0.549137 0.5829
Fixed effects
ROAt−1 0.194446 2.907919 0.0036
ln Employee -1.399998 -4.091756 0.0000
ln Employeet−1 0.667102 1.625305 0.1041
ln GDP 9.334712 0.643790 0.5197
ln GDPt−1 -1.058247 -0.089875 0.9284
Ownership 0.552664 2.219512 0.0265
Liberalisation -0.241732 -2.160389 0.0308
Notes: Unbalanced panel with T = 1− 10 and N = 1694.
The number of observations totals 8975.
P-value for Hausman Test is 0.0027.
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Table VIII: Dynamic Model for Sales per Employee
Explained Variable Coefficient Estimate t-value Pr(> |t|)
Random Effects
Intercept 1.262351 6.008554 0.0000
ln Sales per Employeet−1 0.936649 23.51430 0.0000
ln Sales per Employeet−2 -0.093915 -2.764139 0.0057
ln GDP 0.200346 0.210491 0.8333
ln GDPt−1 -0.209192 -0.220575 0.8254
Liberalisation -0.028123 -3.731017 0.0002
Ownership -0.013535 -2.246564 0.0247
Quoted 0.165732 2.562436 0.0104
Fixed Effects
Intercept 10.39426 1.633524 0.1024
ln Sales per Employeet−1 0.467647 9.586423 0.0000
ln Sales per Employeet−2 0.100990 2.903164 0.0037
ln GDP 0.566536 0.675863 0.4992
ln GDPt−1 -1.142097 -1.317690 0.1877
Liberalisation 0.072443 4.104632 0.0000
Ownership -0.036355 -2.000570 0.0455
Notes: Unbalanced panel with T = 1− 10 and N = 1084.
The number of observations totals 5074.
P-value for Hausman Test is 0.0000.
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models White standard errors and covariance matrix were used.
Testing for serial correlation can be done using the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge
test for serial correlation in panel data (see Wooldridge (2002) and Millo & Y (2008)).
For all models the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. To
compare random and fixed effects model the Hausman Test (Hausman 1978) can be
used to compare to sets of estimates. The test-statistic follows a χ2 distribution with
HTest = (βˆFE − βˆRE)
′(Vˆ (βˆFE)− Vˆ (βˆRE))
−1(βˆFE − βˆRE), (IV.1)
where V is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the fixed and random
effects estimator respectively, and βˆ represents the estimated coefficients. The null
hypothesis is that both models are consistent and that the random effects estimator
should be preferred. Results are reported in each Table, where applicable. While
for models with ROA as the dependent variable only the fixed effects estimator is
consistent, with sales per employee random effects estimator can be applied.
(iv) Subsample Analysis: The case of Electricity and Telecoms
One interesting issue, which arises from analysing the particular case of utilities,
is whether reform, especially the removal of entry barriers and more competition
would actually decrease profitability. Two sectors, which have seen the most drama-
tic changes, include electricity and telecommunications. Many countries started out
with very high liberalisation and ownership indicators at the beginning of the sample
period, while substantial reform meant, that towards the end of the sample period
indicators reached very low levels.
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Table IX: Sales per Employee in the Electricity and Telecommunica-
tions Sector
Sector Coefficients Estimate t-value Pr(> |t|)
Electricity
Constant -13.9472 -3.9560 0.0001
Sales per Employeet−1 0.5679 5.5650 0.0000
ln GDP -0.1013 -0.0931 0.9258
ln GDPt−1 1.3308 1.2096 0.2266
Liberalisation 0.0215 1.9120 0.0560
Ownership 0.0668 2.0011 0.0455
Telecommunications
Constant -53.07 -6.0648 0.0000
Sales per Employeet−1 0.5964 8.2894 0.0000
ln GDP 8.3729 3.4219 0.0006
ln GDPt−1 -4.2442 -1.6426 0.1007
Liberalisation 0.0158 4.9204 0.0000
Ownership 0.0151 0.5683 0.5699
Notes: Unbalanced panel with 2614 (Electricity) and 1880 (Telecoms) observations.
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Therefore, it seems worthwhile to look at electricity and telecommunications se-
parately, and analyse a measure of profitability, such as sales per employee. For
simplicity only results for the dynamic model in equation III.4 are reported. Table
IX reports the results of this sub-sample analysis. For electricity, it appears to be
the case that the first lag of sales per employee is highly statistically significant, as
well as economically relevant. This, however, is not true for lnGDP and lnGDPt−1.
This is not the case for the telecommunications sub-sample, where both lnGDP and
lnGDPt−1 are statistically significant. This is in line with expectations, since one
could argue that demand for telecom services is much more elastic and, therefore,
reacts more strongly to business cycles.
The most notable difference to the analysis presented in the previous sections is
that for electricity and telecommunications both indicators are positive. Indeed, it
appears that in both cases more liberalisation and more private ownership actually
led to a decrease in sales per employee4. This suggests that as more firms entered and
were able to compete, and reforms such as third party access (TPA) were undertaken,
sales and profits in the industry fell.
These results, however, do come with a large drawback, in the sense that removing
the sector dimension implies that the indicator now only varies across countries and
time. Seeing as industry dummies were statistically insignificant in the previous
models, this would suggest that better results can be obtained in joint estimation.
4This is also the case when using other measures such as profit per employee.
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V Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that recent reforms have had a significant
impact on utilities’ financial performance. Indicators used in this chapter include the
commonly observed measures return on assets, sales per employee, and profit per
employee. Relying on a number of econometric methods, the results suggest that
ownership and liberalisation do have an impact on firm performance, although this
impact is not uniform.
Building on the OECD data on liberalisation and ownership reform, the paper uses
firm level financial data of over 2000 firms in 18 European countries for electricity,
natural gas, airlines, railways, postal services, and telecommunications. The sample
spans over a period characterised by extensive infrastructure reform from 1996 to
2006.
These reforms included the introduction of TPA agreements in most network
industries, open sky arrangements infringing the rights of national airline carriers,
vertical separation, privatisation of a large number of telecommunication utilities,
and so on. One of the most exciting research questions in this area, therefore, would
naturally be whether overall these reforms had a positive impact. One area where
past research has highlighted the improvements brought on by deregulation and pri-
vatisation, is firm performance and to a much lesser extent quality or prices. However,
large scale studies so far have found it difficult to account for liberalisation other than
by using a dummy variable.
Therefore, this chapter attempted to extend this literature by taking a very broad
approach to answering the question of market reform and firm performance. The
findings suggest that while private involvement had a positive impact on sales per
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employee, liberalisation measures actually had a negative influence on sales per em-
ployee. For return on assets, as a measure of investment performance, the results
were reversed.
Looking at sales per employee for different sub-samples, in particular for the te-
lecommunications and electricity industries, liberalisation and private ownership are
associated with lower sales efficiency. As discussed previously, this may well be a sign
of reforms successfully introducing competition into those industries, thereby lowering
profits or sales.
This chapter has only been able to shed light on a small part of the arguments
and issues surrounding infrastructure reform. It is vital that further research looks at
the particular types of reforms and what they are meant to achieve. The picture of
the unprofitable, inefficient state monopolist appears, from results presented in this
chapter, less sharp than previously drawn.
Chapter 4
On Competition for the Market
and the Cost of Truth Revelation
with Asymmetric Information1
This chapter is related to ground-breaking work by Chadwick (1859) on concessions
as a supplement or even substitute to regulation. Introducing market incentives and
corporate governance in the form of outright privatisation and competition is not an
option in all infrastructure industries. While sectors like electricity and telecommu-
nications have benefited from advances in technology, other industries such as water,
local postal services, and railways have not been met by similar developments. Yet,
the rise of incentive regulation and the advances in auction theory have opened the
door for new ways of dealing with natural monopoly induced market failure. Franchise
bidding carries the promise to achieve more competitive outcomes (that is second-
best pricing, not marginal-cost pricing) even when informational asymmetries and the
existence of essential facilities limit the scope of regulation. Despite these advantages,
franchise bidding also raises a number of questions, in this chapter we approach one
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of them: How can we determine the optimal franchise length?
I Introduction
The terminology competition for the field as an alternative to competition in the field
was first coined by Chadwick (1859) as a solution to natural monopoly problems.
In particular, he criticised the duplication of facilities and infrastructure in water
services and railways and argued that bidding for the right to monopolise would
bring significant cost savings while simultaneously leaving scope for competition at
the bidding stage. In modern economics, Demsetz (1968) reintroduced the concept
of franchise bidding as a substitute for regulation. Public authorities could thereby
define and award monopoly concessions for a given good or service to the best (in
terms of price or subsidies) bidder on fixed terms and over a pre-determined period
of time. If this auction takes place over subsequent franchise periods, it is referred to
as repeated franchise bidding.
It has been shown (Telser 1969) that, under certain conditions, such as an in-
finite number of bidders, franchise bidding can theoretically approach second-best
outcomes (i.e. in the one product case, average-cost pricing) in industries with si-
gnificant scale economies. Yet, while the economics of regulation has been growing
and advancing steadily, and infrastructure policies have moved from direct state ow-
nership to privatisation or PPPs, interest in franchise bidding has re-emerged only
recently (Doni 2004, Meister 2005). The early critique from institutional economics
(Goldberg 1976, Williamson 1976) appeared to have answered Demsetz’ question
1This chapter is based on joint work with Jo¨rg Borrmann, University of Vienna, see co-author’s
statement in Appendix A.
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‘Why Regulate Utilities?’ with a resounding “because franchise bidding is no viable
alternative”. Transaction costs, especially with regard to asset-specific investments
and hold-up,2 halted interest in franchise bidding before it got off the ground.
For most utilities, the degree of (human and physical) asset specificity is signifi-
cant, such that investments are often specialised and unique, and the returns from
alternative employments of the investments are low. This introduces hold-up pro-
blems when specific assets have to be transferred at the end of the franchise period.
Any incumbent anticipating these problems may therefore decide to keep investments
low and run down the existing infrastructure. Moreover, the values of some types of
infrastructure are extremely difficult to assess, e.g. water pipelines buried deep in
the ground. To ease some of those issues, long-term contracts have been proposed
(Williamson 1976), as a possible solution.
Long-term contracts may create problems of their own, as highlighted by the in-
complete contracts literature (Grossman & Hart 1986, Hart & Moore 1988). With
terms and in particular prices fixed over the entire franchise period, long-term contracts
may be less suitable to account for account changing demand and cost conditions.
Even though some contingencies can be written into the contract, contracts will re-
main incomplete. There is at least episodic evidence that the inherent uncertainty in
long-term franchise contracts leads to renegotiation and early contract termination.
Recently, some of the main concerns with regard to franchise bidding, incomplete
contracts and asset specificity have been readdressed in theoretical models. In Harstad
& Crew (1999), the regulator can specify a downward sloping t-curve, so that bidders
with lower bids are assumed to value transaction-specific assets higher and have to pay
2For a detailed survey of empirical evidence in the context of the institutional economics critique
see Crocker & Masten (1996).
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more, should they win the franchise. The t-curve specifies an exact relation between
the price-bid and the value of the transaction-specific assets, which bidders have to
abide to when submitting a simultaneous bid for prices and assets. They show that
at least theoretically such an auction mechanism can mitigate the hold-up problem.
The question of contract length is not solely related to theoretical treatments of
franchise bidding, it is also of great practical importance. In the very least, any
regulatory or governmental agency interested in implementing a concession scheme
must first decide on the length of the franchise term. One may conjure that there
are many important factors which may influence the optimal (with regard to some
welfare concept such as total surplus) length of a given franchise contract. If, for
example, bidding costs are large, longer-term contracts will ceteris paribus lead to a
higher surplus. Similarly, the degree of uncertainty and the longevity of assets, may
be important factors when determining the optimal franchise duration.
To model optimal franchise duration, one would rely on some kind of welfare
measure, such as total surplus (i.e. profits plus consumer surplus). Any auctioneer
or regulator aiming to determine the contract length maximising total-surplus would
need information on cost and demand conditions. However, one key argument in
favour of franchise bidding is that it requires less information on part of the auctioneer
than traditional regulation, and that information rents do not accrue (Harstad &
Crew 1999). Therefore, if one is unwilling to relax informational assumptions, we
need to find a way for informed firms to reveal the optimal contract length to the
auctioneer.
Consequently, we propose an auction mechanism which, under certain conditions,
can induce firms to reveal the optimal franchise duration. We make the extreme
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assumption that the auctioneer does not have any information with regard to cost
and demand conditions and, hence, cannot determine the total surplus maximising
contract length directly. The auctioneer is, however, able to enforce a set of auction
rules in which bidders not only submit a price bid but also a contract length bid.
To this end, we argue, that the issue of truth revelation can be broken down into
two parts. On the one hand, any mechanism created with the aim of determining
optimal franchise duration should establish incentives for bidders to coordinate. On
the other hand, mere coordination does not suffice, as potentially interested bidders
may gather around the ‘wrong’ equilibrium such as their profit-maximising contract
duration. In accordance with these requirements our dynamic revelation mechanism
provides two distinct instruments for the regulator, one coordination instrument and
one instrument for punishment.
This chapter first gathers some stylised facts on franchise bidding. The next part
describes the auction rules and general set-up of the model. Section V presents the
case of homogeneous bidders under common knowledge, while in Section VI common
knowledge exists only among bidders. Finally, results for heterogeneous bidders are
presented in Section VI. The last section offers our conclusions.
II Some Stylised Facts on Franchise Bidding
Concessions for the right to monopolise have been awarded in a variety of industries
and countries. Early examples include the cable and television licenses in the US
(CATV), an industry with moderate sunk costs. However, recently concessions have
been awarded in water and sewage industries, electricity, gas, transport infrastructure
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(roads, railways, airports, ports), and telecommunications (most prominently 3G li-
censes in Europe–although strictly speaking oligopoly franchises). In the context of
our model, the two primary aspects of interest are the length of franchise contracts
and cases of early termination and renegotiation.
(i) Length of Franchise Contracts
Across industries and countries the type of contracts awarded, from short-term ma-
nagement contracts to a full transfer of ownership and risk, and the fashion in which
contracts are awarded differ greatly, from sophisticated auction mechanisms to less
formal “beauty contests” (Affuso 2002). In the French water sector, contracts are
often renewed without competitive tendering. Prior to the ‘Public Services Delega-
tion Law’ of 1995, which laid out new rules governing the provision of public services,
some contracts were running for periods of 75 years or longer. One extreme example
would be the municipality of Nice, which has had the same water supplier since the
end of the 19th century (Elnaboulsi 2001, Chong et al. 2006).
Generally, the length of franchising contracts varies across industries and coun-
tries. Longer-term contracts, however, are more common than the short-term contracts
envisioned by Demsetz (1968) and Posner (1972). This may be another indication that
in infrastructure industries hold-up problems and investment incentives are considered
to be the major issues. Depending on the type of industry and regulator preferences,
concessions are awarded for periods of up to 100 years, although the typical period
for infrastructure, such as water and railways, appears to be much shorter, with most
governments and regulators opting for 15 to 30 year periods.
Water concessions in South America were awarded for periods of 20 to 40 years,
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with franchises in Brazil and Ecuador running for 30 years, while Chile and Mexico
awarded slightly shorter franchises of 20 to 25 years (Hall & Lobina 2002). In Bolivia
water concession contracts (e.g. Cochabamba), were awarded for 40 years. Similarly,
water privatisations in Africa (Bayliss 2001) involve renewable contracts of 15, 20 or
30 years, with some shorter management contracts also being awarded. These water
concessions were typically tied with electricity concessions (for example in Chad,
Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Mali).
The case of the British railway sector has already been elaborated in some detail
in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it seems important to emphasise that the first round of
franchises was fairly short, considering the longevity of the assets. The rail franchises
were awarded for seven or ten years depending on investments, however, in the second
round, a policy change was enacted and much longer franchises of 20 years and more
were awarded. The electricity distribution system of the London Underground, on the
other hand, was awarded for a much longer period, namely 30 years (Littlechild 2002).
In Argentina, electricity distribution as well as water concessions were awarded
for 99 years. Bidding is scheduled to take place every ten years, with an initial period
of 15 years. In railways, Brazil opted for longer term 30 year concessions, whereas
Argentina differentiated between 30 (plus a possible ten year extension)-year freight
concessions and ten (plus a possible ten year extension)-year passenger concessions
(Estache et al. 2002).
So, typically, the length of franchise contracts in infrastructure tends to be around
ten to 30 years. It is somewhat disconcerting that the particular length of the conces-
sions appears slightly arbitrary, and that one may well argue that these medium-
length contracts are merely chosen out of convenience or habit. In addition, it is, of
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course, difficult to establish whether this bracket is too wide and should optimally
be much narrower. This chapter highlights that decisions on contract length are
inherently difficult to make.
(ii) Renegotiation and Early Termination
With regard to renegotiation and early franchise termination, the picture is similarly
diffused. Cases from railways, water, and electricity franchise experiences suggest
that pre-mature contract termination is neither the exception nor the rule. Although
water concessions in Argentina have led to health improvements (Galiani et al. 2005),
they were, at the same time, marred by renegotiation and early termination. Often,
renegotiation centred on prices and tariffs.
Overall, one would have to conclude that early contract termination and rene-
gotiation can be frequently found for infrastructure franchises, seemingly enforcing
concerns that firms engage in ex-post opportunistic behaviour due to incomplete
contracts and that governments face commitment issues. In Bolivia, Argentina, and
Brazil, water concessions were terminated prematurely after failed renegotiation at-
tempts. A very prominent case was the Buenos Aires water concession, which was
terminated in 2006 despite 17 years of franchise contract remaining. Prior to rena-
tionalisation numerous renegotiations (and attempts) took place (Casarin, Delfino &
Delfino 2007).
The Buenos Aires case highlights some common problems in renegotiation and
early termination. There was some failure to expand capacity as outlined in the
franchise contract. Moreover, tariffs increased by 80 per cent in real terms (Casarin
et al. 2007). Other water franchises in South America were also terminated early.
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They include the Tucuman franchise in Argentina and the Bolivian concession in
Cochabamba, which were terminated early after price rises and failed renegotiation
attempts.
Informal price negotiation also took place in Guinea (Bayliss 2001), whereas the
Trinidad water concession with Severn Trent was terminated early in 1999 and res-
ponsibilities for water and waste water services were put back in the hand of the public
authorities (Hall & Lobina 2002). These failures highlight that negotiations within
a regulatory structure are less problematic than informal, unplanned renegotiations
that go beyond contractual contingencies.
In Senegal, the first water privatisation attempt was short-lived with renationa-
lisation after 18 months only. It ended in 2000 with the government repurchasing
the shares of Hydro-Quebec International and Elyo. The original license period was
ten years but after tariff disputes fostered by rising oil prices all shares were bought
back by the government. In a second attempt in 2001, the privatisation mode was
changed to a 25 year lease as opposed to the previous outright privatisation. Failure
to reach an agreement with the winning bidder meant that the second attempt was
consequently aborted. (Go¨kgu¨r & Jones 2006)
Railway concessions have been awarded (amongst others) in Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Following financial difficulties the British
Connex South Eastern franchise was terminated eight years prematurely by the Stra-
tegic Rail Authority (SRA) who then took over as a supplier of last resort. In Brazil
and Argentina renegotiations started a few years into the franchise. The renegotiation
process in Argentina included minor issues such as contract ambiguities but also the
threat of bankruptcy and the response to excess demand (Estache et al. 2002).
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The evidence presented here is highly circumstantial. In one of the few econometric
contributions, an analysis of cable TV licenses showed that renegotiation did not occur
frequently — in only 60 out of 3000 cases (Zupan 1989). However, it again should be
noted that cable TV licenses differ from infrastructure industries not only in terms
of cost structure but also demand. Water, sewage, electricity, and postal services for
example do not have close substitutes and demand is inelastic, at least in the short
term.
Generally, renegotiations are usually centred around tariffs and financing. Failure
to resolve these disputes has, in some cases, lead to early contract termination and
renationalisation. One part of the problem appears to be related to the auctioneer’s
commitment problems. Any regulator or government overseeing a concession scheme
faces the dilemma of having to decide if and when to take the ultimate step of termi-
nating a franchise. Of course, in the case of infrastructure concessions the seller often
has residual interests in the franchise, and commitment to targets and tariffs set out
in the contract may not be plausible.
In other instances, one may conclude that the winner’s curse problem could be of
similar importance. Often, the value of infrastructure concessions, sometimes after
decades of state ownership, will not be known to bidders. Thus, the winning bidders
may turn out to be those who over-estimated the possible returns and under-estimated
the risks of running a long-term infrastructure franchise. This argument has also been
forwarded by franchisees as a justification for renegotiation attempts.
What can be learned from these selected cases (for a summary refer to Table I)
is, on the one hand, that franchise bidding schemes have been implemented widely in
the past ten years, maybe more so than commonly assumed (see e.g. Harstad & Crew
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(1999) who argue that franchise bidding has not been widely adopted). Further, we
can observe that renegotiation and early termination occur, although it is likely that
the selection is biased, as problematic cases are the first to be examined by scholars
and the media alike. Moreover, franchise duration varies considerably, partially in
accordance with risk sharing mechanisms, i.e. short-term management contracts vs.
long-term full privatisation. By and large, however, medium-term contracts seem to
be the favoured policy. While this chapter addresses one of the issues highlighted
in this section, i.e. optimal contract duration, the need for further research remains
pressing.
Table I: Selected Cases of Concessions Awarded
Location and Sector Contract Length Early Termination
France, water 1 to 75 years
Argentina, water typically 30 years in Bue-
nos Aires 99 years (with
rebidding)
Yes, failed renegotiation
Brazil, water typically 30 years Yes, failed renegotiation
Ecuador, water typically 30 years
Chile, water 20 to 25 years
Mexico, water 20 to 25 years
Bolivia , water 40 years Yes, failed renegotiation
Senegal, water first 10 years then 25 years Yes, failed renegotiation
Chad, Gabon, Mali, water
and electricity
15, 20 or 30 years Yes, failed renegotiation
Britain, electricity (Un-
derground)
30 years
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Table I (continued)
Location and Sector Contract Length Early Termination
Argentina, electricity 99 years in Buenos Aires
(with rebidding)
Britain, railways 7-10 and in the second
period 20-30 years
1 early termination in first
franchise period
Brazil, railways 30 years
Argentina, railways 30 years for freight, 10
years for passenger ser-
vices
Renegotiations, threats of
bankruptcy
Source: Please refer to the text for citations of relevant papers.
III Set-up of the Model
In this section, we describe the set-up of the model and a set of well-defined auction
rules, which will determine the outcome of the auction process. These rules are
centred on two instruments used by the regulator, a penalty, p, and a coordination
instrument, h. Moreover, we discuss our assumptions with regard to the behaviour
of the auctioneer and the bidding firms.
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(i) General Motivation and Description of the Mechanism
In principle, repeated franchise bidding does not require a finite time horizon. Ho-
wever, in practice, an auctioneer might want to change a definition of the franchise,
or adapt the franchise duration due to changing cost and demand conditions, or even
terminate a franchise agreement. Therefore, we realistically assume that there is a
fixed finite time interval, [0, T ], which is divided n times to yield franchises of equal
contract length, l = T/n, where n is a positive integer.3 Let the expected value, E,
of total surplus, TS (·), be a function of time, t, and denote the social discount rate
chosen by the auctioneer by r. Then, we can define the expected value, E, of n∗,
the optimal number of bidding periods,4 which maximises expected discounted total
surplus in the time interval, [0, T ] as:
E[n∗] = argmax
(
n∑
i=1
(∫ iT
n
(i−1)T
n
E[TS(t)]e−rtdt
))
. (III.1)
There are two possible cases to differentiate. If bidders have common knowledge with
respect to other players’ cost functions then E[n∗] will be identical for risk-neutral
bidders. If bidders are not perfectly informed about each others cost functions, they
will form individual estimates of E[n∗], which we denote Ej[n
∗].
Due to a lack of information, the auctioneer is never able to determine E[n∗]
directly. At first glance, it seems reasonable to require firms to report their estimates
of E[n∗], or, Ej[n
∗], to the auctioneer. However, the difficulty is that firms can be
assumed to maximise expected discounted profits: Let the expected value, E, of the
profits, Πj (·), of a firm, j, be a function of time, t, and denote the discount rate chosen
by a firm, j, by ρj. Then, we can define the expected value, E, of ν
∗
j , of a firm, j, the
3In principle, n, could be measured in days, weeks, months, or years.
4For simplicity, we assume that there is a unique global maximum of TS (·) at n∗.
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optimal number of bidding periods,5 which maximises expected discounted profits in
the time interval, [0, T ] by:
E[ν∗j ] = argmax
(
v∑
i=1
(∫ iT
v
(i−1)T
v
E[Πj(t)]e
−ρjtdt
))
. (III.2)
Therefore, E[ν∗j ] is the value which a risk-neutral firm, j, can be assumed to report.
It has no incentive to report its true estimate of E[n∗]. As a second-best solution,
the auctioneer may implement a mechanism to solve the problem. It determines n,
which approximates E[n∗].
To do so, the auctioneer asks all bidders to submit their estimate of E[n∗] prior
to the actual start of the franchise bidding auctions. It will also inform the bidders
of the magnitude of crucial parameters they will need for their calculation, such as
r, the social discount rate, and a, the administrative costs of the auctioneer, which,
we assume, is billed to the bidding firms. Depending on the auctioneer’s prior beliefs
she will set a coordination parameter, h, and require that submitted estimates do not
differ by more than what is expected by the auctioneer. If they do differ by more than
h, no franchise auctions will take place and a supplier of last resort is chosen instead.
If, however, the absolute differences between submitted estimates are within h, then,
over the course of the franchise auctions, the auctioneer is able to update her beliefs
on the optimal number of franchise periods, and she can use this new information to
implement a penalty system. In particular, the auctioneer will punish bidders, if the
submitted estimates turn out to be very far from the auctioneer’s upated subjective
estimate of E[n∗], which we denote EA[n
∗].
5For simplicity, we assume that there is a unique global maximum of Πj (·) at ν
∗
j .
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Table II: Timing of the Mechanism
Timeline Auctioneer Bidders
t = 0 Informs public about mono-
poly franchise and rules
t = 1 Requires firms to register
t = 2 Sets coordination parameter,
h
t = 3 Announces coordination pa-
rameter, h, the social dis-
count rate, r, the number
of bidders, the administrative
costs a, and the magnitude of
penalty, p
t = 4 Submit estimate of
E[n∗]
t = 5 Announces if bidding process
will take place
t = 6 If bidding takes place she an-
nounces contract length
t = 7 Franchise auctions start Take part in first
franchise auction
Please refer to the auction rules outlined below.
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(ii) Bidders
Each of the registered firms maximises expected discounted profits. Each bidder
assumes that he has at least one non-colluding competitor at each stage of the bidding
process.6 When submitting its estimate, mj, of E[n
∗], the discounted profits expected
by a registered firm are greater than zero. Bidders are perfectly informed about
their own cost7 functions and the market demand function at each point in time
in the time interval, [0, T ] (private values assumption). For simplicity, the market
demand function is assumed to be common to all bidders.8 Bidders cannot observe
the cost functions of the other bidders. The cost functions of the bidding firms exhibit
economies of scale.9 None of the bidding firms is financially constrained.10
Bidders form subjective beliefs on the estimate that will trigger a penalty. These
beliefs can be characterised by distribution and density functions, where Prj(mj) =
δ(mj) denotes the subjective probability that the penalty will have to be paid after
submitting an estimate, mj.
From the outset, it is apparent that, if there is no common knowledge among
bidders, the usefulness of truth revelation will be related to two factors. Firstly, if
6If bidders are homogeneous, then they will simply assume that the probability to win an auction
is equal to the number of registered bidders divided by the number of franchise auctions. If bidders
are heterogeneous, we assume that bidders cannot perfectly determine the cost function of the most
efficient firm, willing to take part in the bidding process. Therefore, as long as their ex-ante valuations
of the franchise over the entire time interval are positive they will take part in the submission of
estimates, mj , and the subsequent franchise auctions.
7In this context, costs are meant to include bidding costs.
8Franchise bidding with differences in demand has been analysed by Borrmann & Schaffhauser-
Linzatti (2008).
9The concept of (cost) economies of scale is described in Baumol et al. (1988).
10As pointed out by Rothkopf (2001), the assumption that none of the bidding firms is financially
constrained ensures that bidders are indifferent between winning and losing at the respective least
profitable bids they are willing to make. This assumption is, for instance, fulfilled in case that capital
markets are perfect. Some models have been developed which describe bidders facing financial
constraints, e.g. Che & Gale (1998).
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E[n∗] and E[ν∗j ] are approximately similar, then there is not much to be gained from
revealing E[n∗]. Secondly, if expectations of bidders, j, Ej[n
∗] differ in a biased and
significant way from E[n∗], then the collective estimate of the optimum might not be
nearer to E[n∗] than the auctioneers’ expectation, EA[n
∗]. Therefore, the mechanism
is useful only, if the firms have collectively a better understanding of the industry
than the auctioneer.
(iii) Auctioneer
Prior to the bidding process the risk-neutral auctioneer has neither knowledge of the
cost function of the bidder(s) with the most efficient technology, nor of the market
demand function. She is able to credibly commit herself to the mechanism, especially
the parameters set by herself such as, the social discount rate, r, the penalty, p, the
coordination variable, h, her expected number, b, of bidders, her expected adminis-
trative costs, a, per auction, and the assumption that all participants are equal. Over
time, as bidding takes place in [0, T ], she is able to gather information which may
indicate the approximate welfare-maximising number of bidding periods, n∗. As such
the auctioneer is able to update her belief to EA[n
∗].
The coordination parameter, h, is related to the auctioneer’s subjective belief of
the degree of common knowledge in the industry. With a common market demand,
these differences will be a result of different cost functions. In the absence of common
knowledge from the point of view of the auctioneer, h, is a result of the inability of
individual bidders to observe the cost-minimising (and thus total surplus-maximising)
E[n∗].11 Implicitly, h is thus connected to the auctioneer’s beliefs on bidders’ cost
11Without common knowledge, the cost-minimising bidder is not aware that she could in fact
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functions and their individual estimates, Ej[n
∗]. Like, n, it is a positive integer which
can, for instance, be measured in days, weeks, months or years.
We can distinguish two cases. If the auctioneer believes that all firms taking part
in the bidding process know E[n∗], then she will set h equal to zero, because if for
example firm A submits a bid of four franchise periods and firm B a bid of seven
franchise periods then (at least) one of them is “lying”. In all other instances h will
be greater than zero because each firm will have individual estimates Ej[n
∗]. Thus,
the auctioneer could for example set h equal to two franchise periods. In the above
example the franchise auctions would still not take place, since the difference between
submitted estimates is greater than the allowed absolute difference, |4 − 7| = 3 > 2.
In this case a supplier of last resort will be instated.
For a risk-neutral auctioneer the magnitude of h will be related to her knowledge of
the industry. With a fixed demand function the differences in Ej[n
∗] will arise through
differences in cost estimates. These could, for example, be a result of the utilisation
of technology, efficiency levels, different employments of labour and capital, and so
on. An auctioneer will take exactly those factors into consideration when setting
h. Of course, an auctioneer who has little knowledge of the industry will have more
difficulty determining h than a well-established regulator who switches from some
existing, well-functioning, regulatory regime to franchise bidding.
In infrastructure industries such as water for example, where technology is fairly
homogeneous and standardised, an auctioneer would set a smaller h than in an indus-
try such as telecommunications, which is driven by innovations, research and develop-
ment. Similarly, if there is an industry which has been regulated, in particular with
determine, E[n∗], without knowing the cost functions of all other bidders.
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regimes that foster convergence such as incentive regulation and benchmarking, the
auctioneer will know that differences in Ej[n
∗] cannot be too large. Other information
the auctioneer could review would be the ownership structure in the industry. The
differences in Ej[n
∗] might be larger, if there is a mixture of privately and publicly
owned utilities rather than just privately owned ones. As such the auctioneer will
use her knowledge of the industry to assess the possible differences in Ej[n
∗] and,
possibly, the underlying differences in costs.
(iv) Rules and Timing of the Mechanism
Our mechanism, which uses the knowledge of the firms willing to participate in the
bidding process, is defined by ten rules referring to different points in time.
Rule 1: At t = 0, the auctioneer informs the public about an exactly defined
monopoly franchise for the provision of a particular good to be repeatedly awarded
via competitive bidding in sealed-bid auctions without a reserve price within the fixed
time interval [0, T ]. She also informs bidders about the general framework (Rules
2− 10).
Rule 2: At t = 1, the auctioneer requires all firms, j, j = 1, ...,M , willing to
participate in the bidding process to register.
Rule 3: If it is common knowledge among all registered firms as well as the
auctioneer that all registered firms are identical, then the auctioneer sets the coordi-
nation variable, h, which reflects the knowledge of bidders, to 0 at t = 2. In all other
cases, the auctioneer sets the coordination variable, h, to a strictly positive value at
t = 2. The more heterogeneous the auctioneer expects the registered firms estimates,
Ej[n
∗], to be, the larger is the value which h assumes.
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Rule 4: At t = 3, the auctioneer informs all registered firms about the magnitude
of h and about the social discount rate, r. She also informs all registered firms about
the number, b12, of bidders expected by her, which is assumed to be constant over
auctions. In addition, she informs all registered firms of her own administrative costs,
a, per auction which she expects, which is assumed to be constant over auctions, and
will be billed to bidders. Furthermore, the auctioneer informs all registered firms that
they will have to calculate their best estimate, mj, of E[n
∗], i.e. the expected optimal
number of bidding periods, until t = 4. The auctioneer obliges the registered firms to
base their estimates on the social discount rate, r, on the auctioneer’s expected num-
ber, b, of bidders, on the auctioneer’s expected administrative costs, a, per auction,
and on the assumption that all participants are equal.
Rule 5: If the auctioneer later detects that, for one or more firms, |mj−EA[n
∗]| >>
0, where EA[n
∗] is the updated belief of the auctioneer, then she imposes a penalty
on all registered firms who set |mj − EA[n
∗]| >> 0. The auctioneer determines the
magnitude of this penalty, p < 0, at t = 3. She also informs all registered firms on
p and on the circumstances under which the penalty will have to be paid by (some
of) the registered firms. In the special case where h = 0, p will be imposed as
soon as estimates differ. In addition, the auctioneer informs all registered firms that
0 ≤ h << |mj − EA[n
∗]|.13
12This is a simplifying assumption to ensure, that all interested bidders can calculate the expected
payoff from taking part in the actual franchise bidding auctions. The number of bidders will, all
things equal, have an effect on the probability to win and thus effect bidder’s valuations. For
simplicity the auctioneer could, for example, declare that number of interested bidders, j, will be
equal to b.
13This statement implies that it is easier for the auctioneer to determine the degree of cost
differences among bidders, than to gather knowledge about E[n∗]. This assumption is fairly plausible,
since in order to determine E[n∗] the auctioneer needs information on cost and demand functions.
Forming a belief on h only requires the auctioneer to think about how different the estimates, Ej [n
∗],
could be.
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Rule 6: At t = 4, the auctioneer asks all registered firms to submit their estimates,
mj, of E [n
∗], to the auctioneer.
Rule 7: At t = 5, the auctioneer announces to start the bidding process at
t = 7, if |mj −mk| ≤ h ∀j 6= k. If there are at least two registered firms, j 6= k,
with |mj −mk| > h, the auctioneer does not start the bidding process. In this case,
the good is delivered by some supplier of last resort over the entire fixed finite time
interval, [0, T ] . This supplier of last resort is appointed by the government. If the
good is delivered by the supplier of last resort, the game ends.
Rule 8: If the auctioneer’s coordination variable, h, equals 0, and if |mj −mk| =
h = 0 ∀j 6= k, then n = mj, j = 1, 2, ...,M . In case that the auctioneer’s coordination
variable, h, is strictly positive, i.e. h > 0, then n =nint
(
1
M
∑M
j=1mj
)
, where nint(·)
represents the nearest integer function.
Rule 9: In case that the bidding process was not stopped, an exactly defined
monopoly franchise for the provision of a particular good is repeatedly awarded via
competitive bidding in sealed-bid auctions without a reserve price within the fixed
finite time interval, [0, T ]. At t = 6, the auctioneer informs all registered firms that
bidding will take place n times at the beginning of time intervals of equal contract
length, l. Each time when an auction takes place, the monopoly franchise is awarded
to the firm bidding the lowest price. In the event of a tie, only one of the bidders is
chosen by a predetermined allocative mechanism, e.g. a lottery. The winning bidder
has to supply the total quantity demanded of the good in the following contractual
period at the price he bid. The first auction takes place at t = 7, which is identical
with the lower bound of the fixed finite time interval, [0, T ], i.e. 0.
Rule 10: In case that the bidding process was started at t = 7, the auctioneer
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gathers information on the true E[n∗] in [0, T ] to enforce Rule 5. She has to announce
which (if any) firms, j, have to pay the penalty, p.
IV Homogeneous Bidders under Common Knowledge among
all Players
If the auctioneer knows that the interested firms are homogeneous with regard to
their cost and demand functions, then Rule 3 applies, and therefore the auctioneer’s
coordination variable, h, equals 0. In addition, in this special case, the auctioneer
will enforce the penalty, p, as soon as submitted estimates are not equal. Then the
analysis of the mechanism is relatively straightforward.
Proposition IV.1. If it is common knowledge among all firms, j, j = 1, ...,M ,
willing to participate in the bidding process as well as the auctioneer that all firms,
j, are identical, then there exists a unique equilibrium where all firms, j, reveal their
best estimates, mj, of E[n
∗] truthfully.
Proof. In the case of identical bidders with common knowledge, the auctioneer will
set the coordination parameter h = 0 and announce that a large penalty, p, will have
to be paid if |mj −mk| > 0. The entire strategy set of the identical players is given
by the submitted number of franchise periods, mj ∈ N
+ for all j = 1, ...,M, where
the expected payoff function of player j when submitting mj, is a function of mj and
the other −j players’ strategies:
uj(mj,m−j) = [Vj(a, b, l(mj,m−j), r, ρj) + δ(mj)p (IV.1)
+(1− δ(mj)) · 0]ζ(mj,m−j) + [0 + p](1− ζ(mj,m−j)),(IV.2)
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where Vj(·) is the expected value of the franchise over the entire franchise period
[0, T ], as a function of franchise length, l = T
n(·)
, the number of bidders b, the admi-
nistrative costs, a and the discount rate r. The probability that all submitted bids
are equal is denoted by ζ(mj,m−j), and the subjective probability that the penalty
p will have to be paid in this case is given by δ(mj). According to Rule 2, if h = 0
and the submitted estimates, mj, of the total surplus maximising number of franchise
periods, E[n∗], are not identical for all participating bidders, then the penalty, p, will
have to be paid by all bidders. The probability that the difference between submitted
estimates, mj, is greater than 0 is given by (1− ζ(mj,m−j)).
If bidders submit the total surplus-maximising number of franchise periods, E[n∗],
then the value of the franchise for each of the individual bidders can be denoted
V (a, b, T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ), which will be identical in the special case of homogeneous bidders.
If all bidders submit an estimate mj = E[n
∗], the payoff function simplifies to
u(E[n∗]) =
[
V (a, b,
T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ) + δ(E[n∗])p+ (1− δ(E[n∗])) · 0
]
(IV.3)
= V (a, b,
T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ) > 0, (IV.4)
where, from Rule 5, we know that, in this special case, δ(E[n∗]) = 0, and no
penalty will have to be paid. As the number of bidders is finite, i.e. under imperfect
competition, the expected value of the franchise, V (a, b, T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ), is strictly positive
for all bidders.
Further, in the special case of identical firms, the expected optimal number of
bidding periods, E[v∗],which maximises expected discounted profits in the time in-
terval, [0, T ], will be identical for all bidders. By definition, this will be the number
of franchise periods which will maximise the value of the franchise for each individual
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bidder V (a, b, l(v∗), r, ρ). The payoff function can then be denoted as
u(E[v∗]) =
[
V (a, b,
T
E[v∗]
, r, ρ) + δ(E[v∗])p− (1− δ(E[v∗])) · 0
]
(IV.5)
From Rule 5, bidders know that the auctioneer is able to learn over the course
of the franchise, and detect eventually whether the submitted estimate mj differs
significantly from E[n∗]. For the profit-maximising, E[v∗], we state | E[v∗]−E[n∗] |>>
0, and thus the subjective probability, δ(·), that the penalty p will have to be paid is
strictly positive. The fact that this penalty is sufficiently large guarantees that
V
(
a, b,
T
E[v∗]
, r, ρ
)
+ δ(E[v∗])p < 0, (IV.6)
and it follows that for all bidders, j = 1, ...M , the strategy to submit E[v∗] is strictly
dominated by the strategy mj = E[n
∗], since
V
(
a, b,
T
E[v∗]
, r, ρ
)
+ δ(E[v∗])p < 0 < V
(
a, b,
T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ
)
. (IV.7)
The second inequality arises, as shown above, from the fact that with a finite
number of bidders, the bidder’s valuations will be strictly positive. To complete the
proof, we need to show that any other strategy mj 6= E[n
∗] 6= E[v∗] will never be
played by any of the bidders. In this case, the expected payoff is given by
uj(mj,m−j) = [V (·) + δ(mj)p+ (1− δ(·) · 0] ζ(·) + (0 + p)(1− ζ(·)), (IV.8)
= [V (·) + δ(mj)p] ζ(·) + p(1− ζ(·)) (IV.9)
where V (a, b, l(mj), r, ρ) is a function of n, the number of franchise periods, as
determined by the submitted estimates, mj. With mj ∈ N
+\{E[n∗], E[v∗]}, the
probability that the submitted estimates will differ, (1− ζ(mj,m−j)), will be strictly
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positive. Since p < 0 is sufficiently large, we have
[V (a, b, l(mj,m−j), r, ρ) + δ(mj)p]ζ(·) < p(1− ζ(·))⇒ uj(mj,m−j) < 0, (IV.10)
for any submitted mj ∈ N
+\{E[n∗], E[v∗]}. Thus, with homogeneous bidders and
common knowledge, any strategy mj ∈ N
+\{E[n∗]} is strictly dominated by submit-
ting an estimate of mj = E[n
∗], for all bidders, j = 1, ...M .
Corollary IV.2. If it is common knowledge among all firms, j, j = 1, ...,M , willing
to participate in the bidding process as well as the auctioneer that all firms, j, are
identical, the estimates, mj, of E [n
∗] are identical for all firms, j.
Proof. Follows from Proposition IV.1.
Proposition IV.1 and Corollary IV.2 ensure that, in the case of identical firms and
common knowledge, truth-revelation is the only equilibrium strategy. Therefore, all
submitted estimates will be identical. To illustrate, we can construct a simple diagram
using the valuations of the actual franchise contracts. Strategies with valuations lower
than V (E[n∗], ·) are not feasible and therefore can be ignored. For instance, strategies
around V (E[v∗], ·) will not be chosen because of the penalty p associated with setting
|mj−EA[n
∗]| >> 0.With h equal to 0, firms are forced to coordinate, as any deviation
|mj − m−j| > 0 results in a negative payoff, u(mj,m−j). Therefore, the only point
where coordination is possible and expected payoffs are strictly positive is E[n∗]. The
result of this special case is driven by the auctioneer’s knowledge that firms are indeed
identical, hence enabling the auctioneer to enforce the penalty instantaneously, that
is as soon as submitted estimates differ.
This first case is a good illustration of the way our mechanism works twofold.
First, it forces bidders to cooperate, and, second, because of p, interested bidders are
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unable to coordinate on strategies, with the highest valuations, V (E[v∗], ·), so that,
in the case of common knowledge, they are forced to reveal the true optimal franchise
duration. This unique equilibrium is illustrated in Figure I.
Figure I: Equilibrium with Homogeneity and Common Knowledge
V Homogenous Bidders under Common Knowledge only
among Bidders
In the case of an uninformed auctioneer, Rule 2 applies and therefore the auctioneer’s
coordination variable, h, takes a strictly positive value depending on the prior belief
of the auctioneer. The analysis of the mechanism is more complicated, and it is no
longer the best strategy for each of the firms to reveal their best estimates, mj, of
E[n∗] truthfully.
Proposition V.1. If it is common knowledge among all firms but the auctioneer that
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all firms are identical, then there exists an equilibrium where the firms, j, submit an
estimate equal to E [n∗]± h.
Proof. The expected payoff for player j as a function of submitted estimates, mj
and m−j, of the optimal number of franchise periods is given by
uj(mj,m−j) =
[Vj (a, b, l(mj,m−j), r, ρj) + δ(mj)p+ (1− δ(mj)) · 0] ζ(mj,m−j)+(1−ζ(mj,m−j))·0,
(V.1)
where ζ(mj,m−j) is the probability that franchise auctions will take place n times
in the interval [0, T ], with l = T
n(·)
, whereas (1 − ζ(mj,m−j)) is the probability that
submitted estimates,mj, differ by more than the coordination paramter, h, announced
in stage 2 and that consequently no bidding takes place.
Bidder j will only submit an estimate of, mj, which thus solves the following
maximisation problem:
max
mj
{[Vj(·) + δ(mj)p+ (1− δ(mj)) · 0] ζ(mj,m−j) + (1− ζ(mj,m−j)) · 0} . (V.2)
As a participation constraint, we require the expected payoff for, mj, to be strictly
positive:
[Vj(·) + δ(mj)p+ (1− δ(mj)) · 0] ζ(mj,m−j) + (1− ζ(mj,m−j)) · 0 > 0. (V.3)
For any ζ(·) > 0, the condition simplifies to
Vj (a, b, l(mj,m−j), r, ρj) > δ(mj)p, (V.4)
where δ(mj) is the subjective belief that the penalty, p, has to be paid when
submitting an estimate, mj, while Vj(·) is the value of the franchise which depends
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on n(·), the average estimate of all submitted optimal number of franchise periods
defined in Rule 8. In the case of homogeneous bidders and common knowledge, the
expected value of the franchise will be the same for all bidders so that
Vj(·) = V−j(·) = V (·). (V.5)
From Rule 5 and Proposition IV.1 we can recall that, for identical players, the stra-
tegy of submitting the expected profit-maximising number of periods E[v∗] is strictly
dominated by the strategy of submitting the expected total surplus-maximising num-
ber of franchise periods, E[n∗]:
V
(
a, b,
T
E[v∗]
, r, ρ
)
+ δ(E[v∗])p < 0 < V
(
a, b,
T
E[n∗]
, r, ρ
)
. (V.6)
Thus, the strategy space for any player, j, reduces to mj ∈ N
+\{E[v∗]}. From
Rule 5, we also know that deviations from E[n∗] with a magnitude of h, or smaller,
will not trigger the penalty, as 0 < h << |mj − EA[n
∗]| and therefore the subjective
probability, δ(·), that a penalty will have to paid when submitting an estimate mj±h,
will be 0 and payoffs simplify to:
u(E[n∗]± h,m−j) = [V (a, b, l(E[n
∗]± h), r, ρ)] ζ(E[n∗]± h). (V.7)
By assumption, for any given ζ(mj,m−j), and, in the case of identical players, it
must hold for any ǫ < h that
uj(E[n
∗]± h,m−j) = [V (a, b, l(E[n
∗]± h), r, ρ)] ζ(E[n∗]± h),m−j > (V.8)
uj(E[n
∗]± ǫ,m−j) = [V (a, b, l(E[n
∗]± ǫ), r, ρ)] ζ(E[n∗]± ǫ, ,m−j) > (V.9)
uj(E[n
∗],m−j) = [V (a, b, l(E[n
∗]), r, ρ)] ζ(E[n∗],m−j). (V.10)
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For any other strategy, with deviations on the total surplus-maximising bid,
[E[n∗]± ε] 6= E[v∗], greater than those allowed by h, ε > h we have:
uj(E[n
∗]± ε,m−j) = (V.11)
[V (a, b, l(·), r, ρ) + δ(·)p+ (1− δ) · 0] ζ(·) + (1− ζ(·)) · 0 (V.12)
uj(E[n
∗]± ε,m−j) = [V (a, b, l(·), r, ρ) + δ(·)p] ζ(·). (V.13)
Suppose now there exists a player j, with δ(E[n∗]± ε) > 0 for any ε > h, then
uj(E[n
∗]± ε,m−j) =
[V (·) + δ(·)p+ (1− δ(·)) · 0] ζ(·) + (1− ζ(·)) · 0 (V.14)
uj(E[n
∗]± ε,m−j) < 0 < uj(E[n
∗]± h,m−j), (V.15)
This particular player has the subjective belief that there is a strictly positive proba-
bility, and that a penalty will have to be paid for any ε > h. With a sufficiently large
penalty, all payoffs resulting from strategies, E[n∗] ± ε, will thereby be negative for
this player. Thus, this player, j, will submit a bid where deviations on the expected
total surplus-maximising number of franchise periods, E[n∗], are exactly equal to h.
If there exists another player, −j, with δ(E[n∗]± ε) = 0 for some ε > h, then the
payoff from u−j(E[n
∗]± ε,m−j) would be strictly positive iff the probability that all
other bids will not deviate more than h is positive, that is we require ζ(·) > 0. In
a competitive bidding process, with a sufficiently large number of bidders, there will
exist a player with δ(E[n∗]±ε) > 0 for any ε > h, and therefore ζ−j(m−j±ε,mj) = 0.
Thus, all players, j, will submit the bid, where they maximise their expected payoff
with
uj(E[n
∗]± h) =
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= [V (·) + δ(E[n∗]± h)p+ (1− δ(·)) · 0] ζ(E[n∗]± h) + (1− ζ(·)) · 0 (V.16)
= [V (·) + 0 · p+ 1 · 0] · 1 + (1− 0) · 0,
where the coordination parameter, h, is fully exploited, with submitted bids mj =
m−j = E[n
∗]± h.
Corollary V.2. If it is common knowledge among all firms, j, j = 1, ...,M , willing to
participate in the bidding process but not the auctioneer that all firms, j, are identical,
the estimates, mj, of E [n
∗] will be identical for all firms, j.
Proof. Follows from Proposition V.1.
Again, the equilibrium can be illustrated using a simple graphical representation.14
Analogous to Figure I strategies yielding payoffs lower than those associated with
E[n∗] and strategies close or equal to E[v∗] are not feasible. However, since the
auctioneer guarantees in Rule 8 that h will be smaller than the point where the
penalty p is enforced, players now have a new point, where coordination is possible,
namely E[n∗] ± h. This equilibrium will be the dominant strategy iff some players
believe that deviations larger than h may trigger the penalty, that is δ > 0. This will
only happen if players assume that the auctioneer is good at gathering information
during the course of the franchise, and setting at a penalty.
In this case, the interested bidders may exploit the entire coordination variable
announced by the auctioneer, even though they are in fact identical. Intuitively, this
result is not surprising, since in the case with known homogeneity among bidders but
not the auctioneer, bidders have a real information advantage. Further, the size of
14Note that in principle the profit-maximising number of periods could be more or less than
the total surplus-maximising number. In the depicted graph, the total surplus-maximising contract
length is longer than the profit-maximising one.
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the information rent is determined by h, the prior belief of the regulator, so that if
the auctioneer “gets it very wrong”, the price in terms of welfare loss will be high.
Proposition V.1 also highlights the importance of commitment. It is clear from the
perspective of the regulator if h > 0 and if m1 = ... = mM , that bidders are indeed
identical. To obtain the true E[n∗], the regulator could simply subtract or add h from
the submitted estimates.15 Of course, the regulator must ensure that such she can
commit to the auction rules and not deviate, as this would be sub-optimal from an
ex-ante point of view. If bidders would anticipate such commitment problems, then
the truth revelation mechanism cannot work.
Figure II: Equilibrium with Homogeneity but no Common Knowledge
15This might not be easily possible, since the auctioneer would need to know whether longer or
shorter franchise periods are better from the point of view of a total surplus-maximising agent.
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VI Heterogeneous Bidders from the Point of View of all
Players
The third possibility is the case when interested bidders are heterogeneous from the
point of view of all players. Depending on her prior beliefs, the auctioneer will
announce some h > 0 as outlined in Rule 2. Interested bidders believe that they
are heterogeneous, and V (·) 6= V (·)j 6= V (·)−j.
Proposition VI.1. If some or all firms are heterogeneous from the point of view of
the interested bidders, then deviations from the optimal E[n∗] are limited by h.
Proof. We have established that submitting a bid mj = Ej[n
∗] will, for any given
ζ(·) > 0, yield a strictly positive payoff
u(Ej[n
∗]),m−j) > 0. (VI.1)
Similarly, submitting a bid mj = Ej[n
∗] ±h or mj = Ej[n
∗] ± ǫ, with ǫ < h for
any given ζ(·) > 0, leads to the following payoffs:
uj(Ej[n
∗]± h,m−j) = [Vj (a, b, l(Ej[n
∗]± h), r, ρj)] ζ(·) > (VI.2)
uj(Ej[n
∗]± ǫ,m−j) = [Vj (a, b, l(Ej[n
∗]± ǫ), r, ρj)] ζ(·) > (VI.3)
uj(Ej[n
∗],m−j) > 0. (VI.4)
We know from equation V.16 that any strategies mj = Ej[n
∗] ± ε, with ε > h,
will not be an equilibrium strategy. So now we are left again with a strategy set of
{Ej[n
∗]± h,Ej[n
∗]) + ǫ, Ej[n
∗]} for any player j.
We now need to distinguish two possible cases, (1) that bidders assume that the
auctioneer’s announced h correctly reflects the degree of common knowledge in the
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industry, and (2) that it does not. In the first case, we note that now Vj(·) 6= V−j(·)
and therefore there may exist a player, j, for whom the payoff, for any given ζ > 0,
are given by
uj(Ej[n
∗] + h,m−j) > u(Ej[n
∗]),m−j). (VI.5)
At the same time, there may exist a player −j, for whom
u(E−j[n
∗]− h,m−j) > u(E−j[n
∗],m−j). (VI.6)
If both players in this case would submit this bid, then
mj −m−j = |(Ej[n
∗] + h)− (E−j[n
∗]− h)| (VI.7)
= 2h > h. (VI.8)
Thus, such a bid will result in a payoff of 0, and no auction will take place.
Therefore, Ej(n
∗) ± h will not be an equilibrium strategy. There is, however,
another strategy which will ensure that the auction will take place, and guarantee
strictly positive payoffs, namely
uj
(
Ej[n
∗]±
h
2
, (E−j[n
∗]±
h
2
)
=
=
[
Vj(·) + δ
(
Ej[n
∗]± h
2
)
p+ (1− δ(·)) · 0
]
ζ (·) + (1− ζ(·)) · 0 (VI.9)
=
[
Vj
(
a, b, l
(
Ej[n
∗]± h
2
)
, r, ρj
)]
ζ
(
Ej[n
∗]± h
2
, (Ej[n
∗]± h
2
)
, (VI.10)
with δ(·), the probability that the penalty will have to be paid being equal to zero for
all players. Any other strategy Ej[n
∗]± ǫ, with ǫ < h
2
, will result in a strictly smaller
payoff than submitting Ej[n
∗] ± h
2
. As we know from equation VI.7, any strategy,
Ej[n
∗]± ǫ, with ǫ > h
2
, will not be played. This will leave only Ej[n
∗]± h
2
as a possible
equilibrium strategy.
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In case (2), bidders believe that the auctioneer was not able to guess h correctly,
and that the true heterogeneity in Ej[n
∗] is greater than the value assumed by the
auctioneer. In this case, the strategy of submitting, Ej[n
∗]± h
2
, may yield zero payoffs
iff ζ(Ej[n
∗] ± h
2
, E−j[n
∗] ± h
2
) = 0. Therefore, depending on player j’s beliefs on the
degree of heterogeneity reflected in ζ(Ej[n
∗]± h
2
, E−j[n
∗]± h
2
), and on the valuations
Vj(·), player j may find it optimal to submit some strategy E−j[n
∗] ± ǫ, with ǫ < h
2
.
Thus, the players’ optimal strategies are limited by h.
In the case of heterogeneous firms, the mechanism limits the deviations from
the expected total-surplus maximising number of franchise periods, E[n∗], by forcing
bidders to take into account other bidders’ possible valuations. Similarly to the
previous case, with common knowledge only among bidders, the sufficiently large
penalty ensures, that deviations larger than h are not an equilibrium strategy.
The deviations from the optimal E[n∗] will also be smaller than in the previous
case, as bidders now no longer have an informational advantage. Thus, this case is in
between the previous two cases. Indeed, this result is quite intuitive, when bidders
have more information on their heterogeneity than the auctioneer, then they would
be able to extract more informational rent.
VII Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated how an uninformed auctioneer, who tries to
determine the welfare-maximising franchise duration, can devise a simple mechanism
with the aim of forcing bidders to reveal their estimates of the optimal contract length.
As shown in Section IV, in the case of homogeneous interested firms and common
knowledge, we obtain the result that E [n∗] is revealed truthfully. In all other cases,
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bidders are able to extract a strictly positive information rent and are able to add a
mark-up to E[n∗]. This implies that franchise bidding comes at a cost unless bidders
are identical and it is known that they are.
At first sight, this may seem discouraging, since one of the main areas of franchise
bidding is when the regulator has little or no information on cost and demand condi-
tions. On the other hand, the regulator can minimise the informational rent she has
to give up, by making h small. By setting h > 0, apart form case 1, the auctioneer
gives players a coordination point, and thereby ensures that deviations from E[n∗]
are limited.
With regard to the regulator, the information requirements discussed in this paper
are very low. This, however, is not the case for bidders. We assume that interested
firms have perfect information about their own cost function and the market demand
function at each point in time in the time interval [0, T ], which, admittedly, is a rather
restrictive setting. Nevertheless, it seems sensible in a franchise bidding setting to
assume that potential bidders are well-informed compared to the regulator.
Our paper shows that revelation is difficult. The mechanism introduced can mi-
tigate problems, albeit not perfectly. It will work best when potential bidders are
known to be similar, which is most likely the case in infrastructure industries with an
established technology and few differences in demand, such as water, postal services,
as well as electricity transmission and distribution.
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Appendix C
Abstract
The thesis presents three essays on privatisation and market reform in infrastructure
industries. An analysis of the British railway sector over a period of 40 years in-
vestigates whether the privatisation and divestiture of the former state monopolist
led to performance improvements. Statistical and econometric analysis highlights
the importance of scale economies. Further, there are strong suggestions that while
liberalisation initially led to an increase in cost efficiency, performance deteriorated
over time. The second essay looks at a very broad sample of over 2000 publicly and
privately owned utilities in OECD countries. A range of performance measures are
used to establish that market reform and private ownership have a statistically and
economically significant impact on firm profitability and efficiency. Sub-sample ana-
lysis further suggests that the effects are not uniform across industries. Building on
some stylised facts, the third essay builds a theoretical model of contract length in a
monopoly franchise bidding system. In particular the model introduces a mechanism
which can induce bidders to reveal the total surplus-maximising contract length to
the uninformed regulator.
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Appendix D
Zusammenfassung
Die Dissertation beleuchtet verschiedene Aspekte der Privatisierung und Liberalisie-
rung in den Infrastruktursektoren Wasser, Transportwesen, Energie, und Postdienst-
leistungen. In einer Analyse des Britischen Eisenbahnsektors u¨ber einen Zeitraum
von u¨ber 40 Jahren, wird der Frage nachgegangen ob die durchgefu¨hrten Reformen
und Restrukturierungsmanahmen zu A¨nderungen in der Kosteneffizienz oder Qualita¨t
gefu¨hrt haben. In einem zweiten Essay wird auf Basis einer Stichprobe mit u¨ber 2000
o¨ffentlichen und privaten Infrastrukturunternehmen untersucht ob, und in welchem
Ausmaß, Unterschiede im Hinblick auf finanzielle Kennzahlen erkennbar sind. Im
letzten Kapitel wird in einem theoretischen Model ein Auktionsmechanismus vorge-
stellt, welcher die optimale Laufzeit bei Monopol-Konzessionen (“franchise bidding”)
offenbart. Dabei wird unterstellt, dass die Bieter u¨ber mehr Informationen als der Re-
gulator verfu¨gen und der Mechanismus daher die Bieter dazu veranlasst, zumindest
einen Teil dieser Informationen dem Regulator bekannt zu geben (“truth revelation”).
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